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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Whatever the working class is, it is always changing, always resistant to being fixed in
place or pinned down to a singular notion. Özselçuk and Madra write that “the very notion of
class itself emerges as a consequence of Marx’s repeated attempts to make sense of the changing
forms of economic organizations” unfolding as the feudal mode of production receded and the
capitalist mode began to predominate (Özselçuk and Madra 2005, p. 84). In this view, the
working class is multiple and always shifting because it is constructed on uneven ground. Indeed,
there is something perpetually transitory about capitalism itself: it is always in the process of
being made. New capitalist class structures often emerge from non-capitalist forms of
production. Yet Özselçuk and Madra find that capitalism is beholden to a limit. They use the
Lacanian notion of the “all” to describe this limit as a response to a fundamentally antagonistic
social field that must delimit an acceptable range in which antagonisms can occur. For
capitalism, they write, this limit is that “the reproduction of the exploitative form of
appropriation is not jeopardized” (Özselçuk and Madra 2005, p. 88). However, I argue that today
financialization does away with this limit and yet capitalism remains intact. Today,
financialization does not rely upon any fixed notion of class but is able to incorporate the infinite
variability of class into the calculations necessary to maintain the accumulation process. The
quantifications of the risk of class struggle can be packaged into securities like derivatives and
traded as capital. Financial assets allow for new ways of managing capitalism that do not impose
limits but instead commodify ineradicable antagonisms and make them work for an
accumulation process. In Lacanian terms, this means that financialization has done away with the
capitalist-all and instituted the capitalist non-All [pas tout]. This transformation lends a new
durability to capitalist relations of production by accepting the antagonisms that threaten those
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relations as ineradicable. The capitalist non-All gives antagonism a proper place within the
capitalist relations of production. This transformation in capitalism suggests the possibility of a
similar transformation in communist politics that I seek to theorize here.
Twentieth century communism was a politics of the communist-all. Zupančič writes that
“Abolition of the non-relation has been in fact the way in which the authentic revolutionary
projects of the twentieth century often understood the path to radical emancipation” (Zupančič,
p. 30-31). The all attempts to abolish the non-relation that generates the antagonistic social field
and the non-All makes the non-relation integral to building “a narrative of a higher Relation”
(Zupančič, p. 31). Financialized capitalism is building this narrative of a higher Relation even as
it incorporates antagonisms into the process of capitalist accumulation. Today, we often hear of
the “democratization of finance,” the liberatory potential of “passive income,” and the
compatibility of financialized capitalism with a robust welfare state. This last narrative is
expressed in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). MMT is one of many possible narratives of a
higher Relation compatible with financialization that appropriates the non-relation between
classes for the furtherance of capitalist accumulation through exploitation, but one that may be
especially useful for a contemporary communist movement that seeks to build a communist nonAll. Although MMT is increasingly popular on the Western Left, its orientation toward
antagonism reveals it to be compatible with financialization that allows capitalist power to
proliferate. As the following chapters will show, for MMT, money itself becomes a rational and
technical (or rational-technical) means by which to moderate struggles, thereby blinding itself to
the fundamental antagonisms that shape the social field of financialized capitalism. I pursue an
understanding of the potential for a communist non-All through a reading of MMT as a capitalist
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theory of political economy that responds to the conditions of financialization without ever
challenging them at a foundational level.
To set the stage for this reading of MMT, it is helpful to turn to an analysis of class
antagonisms in capitalist political economy. The historical development of capitalism out of
other forms of production is ongoing. Özselçuk and Madra’s claim that class as a notion
develops out of Marx’s historical analysis of the transition from feudalism suggests that history
is a process of the transformations of class structures. This makes it impossible to speak of
capitalism without a theory of the perpetual transition to capitalism. Capitalism (and indeed, any
form of social organization) is never complete. As a result of this incomplete social organization,
the working class is multiple, global, and can be made to serve the expansion of capital even in
non-capitalist economies. On this last point, Bhattacharya and Seda-Irizarry argue “any account
of capitalism that does not recognize non-capitalist class structures obscures the continuous and
central role of primitive accumulation to the valorization of capital” (Bhattacharya and SedaIrizarry, p. 331). Non-capitalist economies provide capitalists with continuous opportunities to
impose various new forms of economic organization to accumulate capital by dispossession,
thereby shifting the composition of the working class in those economies but never settling on
some “normal” relation between classes. The functioning of capitalism relies upon the
multiplicity of class structures, the ever-changing actuality of class as a form of economic
organization, and the plasticity of the working class. At the same time, “the Worker does not
exist” (Zupančič, p. 33). Indeed, the worker as “subject” is always alienated from the
“substance” of work through the paradoxical valuation of labor under capitalism that Zupančič
describes thusly:
Labor is a product among other products, yet it is not exactly like other products: where
other products have a use value (and hence a substance of value), this particular
3

commodity “leaps over” or “lapses” to the source of value. The use value of this
commodity is to be the source of value of (other) commodities. It has no “substance” of
its own (Zupančič, p. 33).
Under this conception, the worker is left to sell their labor as a commodity even though labor is
the source of value of commodities. The worker sells their labor as if they were a capitalist
selling a commodity, and yet the lack of a direct use-value makes labor into a strange commodity
indeed. I argue that it is precisely this negation of the singular form of “Worker” that actualizes
the multiple contingent organizations of the “working class.” Each contingent economic
organization of the working class is a reaction to the impossibility of the emergence of the
Worker. The working class is multiple because of its negativity. Financialization itself has made
use of this negativity and done away with “the naive belief in the possibility of a nonantagonistic and harmonious way of organizing and regulating the processes of production,
appropriation, and distribution of surplus” (Özselçuk and Madra 2005, p. 85). Since there is no
“normal” form of organizing and regulating capital that is free from antagonism, this means that
class struggle is an inherent risk to capitalism. There can be no capitalism without class struggle
and class struggle threatens to bring capitalism to the point of crisis. Capitalism therefore
requires various strategies and technologies for the management of crisis. It is my goal to study
financialization as a mode of managing capitalism that incorporates non-relation into the process
of accumulation. From that study, I develop an outline of how a political movement for the
communist non-All can take shape by incorporating the antagonisms that undermined twentieth
century communism.
Financialization today provides capitalism with a new way to manage crises. Though it
has often been theorized as contrary to the process of production and accumulation,
“Financialization is not the result of some fatal and persistent inability of capitalism to restore
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profitability or to realize surplus value” but rather is a particular technology of capitalist political
economic power (Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras, p. 99). The failures that are often associated with
financialized capitalism are in some sense constitutive of capitalism’s durability and its success.
Financialization accepts the inevitability of antagonistic class struggle in capitalism and so does
not move to repress antagonisms. Indeed, financialization accepts that for capitalist accumulation
to continue, every assumption of capitalist political economy must be made fluid and negotiable.
Even the form of accumulation itself is put up for wager. Other technologies of power can
directly repress the working class, but financialization “provides a representation and
quantifications of different power and social relations in general” that can be used in the
management of capitalist political economic power (Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras, p. 92). That
is, financialization can conceive of class struggle in monetary terms and thus transform class
struggle itself into another commodity. Once every aspect of capitalist accumulation is
reconciled to risk, the commodification of risk makes capitalism more durable.
In Lacanian terms, financialization transforms capitalism from the capitalist-all that
Özselçuk and Madra consider limited by the form of accumulation through exploitation. The
capitalist non-All of financialization, however, has no such limit because it accepts that even the
form of accumulation through exploitation is at risk. However, class struggle can be
commodified, its risks assessed in monetary terms, and even the sacrifice of accumulation by
exploitation can be made potentially profitable. The commodification of class struggle leaves
nothing off the table and puts every aspect of capitalism itself up for exchange in financial
markets. Zupančič describes the non-All as a type of magnetic charge within a discursive field:
So: the something produced by the signifier, in addition to what it produces as its field,
magnetizes this field in a certain way. It is responsible for the fact that the symbolic field,
or the field of the Other, is never neutral (or structured by pure differentality), but
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conflictual, asymmetrical, “not-all,” [non-All] ridden with a fundamental antagonism
(Zupančič, p. 41).
This magnetism is the driving force behind the durability of financial capitalism. Even though
everything is put up for wager in financialization and there are no strict limits to the form of
capitalist economic organization, the exploitative form appears again and again. Zupančič’s
magnetism here accords with Marx’s notion of “tendential laws” because there are no strict
limits on the form of economic organization and yet economic organization tends to take certain
forms. Financialization creates a symbolic field that is charged toward accumulation while
nonetheless accepting the ineradicable antagonism between the bourgeoisie and various
contingent formations of the working class that put that accumulation at risk. Rather than an all
that imposes a strict limit on the form of economic organization, financialization is non-All
because it accepts conflict and antagonism as inevitable and fundamental parts of social
organization. To understand financialization in Lacanian terms is to understand how putting
accumulation through exploitation up for wager makes capitalism a more resilient and totalizing
form of social organization. The risk of a revolutionary subject overthrowing the capitalist
system is incorporated into the functioning of capitalism itself. Allowing for this antagonism
permits the social field its magnetic charge. The possibility of revolutionary class struggle
magnetizes the social field of financialized capitalism. So long as capitalism is based in the
paradox of the value of labor and the working class is generated by the paradoxical status of
labor in the valuation of commodities, “all attempts at ‘fixing’ class are bound to fail” (Özselçuk
and Madra 2005, p. 87). If all attempts are bound to fail, then what of the non-all? It is precisely
by refusing to fix classes in place that the capitalist non-All of financialization is so able to
maintain the capitalist system.
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Financialization benefits from a certain conceptual slipperiness. As a term, it is difficult
to pin down. Theoretical texts on the topic often begin with a disclaimer such as, “There is no
generally agreed definition, or even understanding, of financialization” (Lapavitsas 2011, p. 611;
see also Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras, p. 89). In these respects, Zupančič’s discussion of an
entirely different subject, sex, is apropos. She writes, “The paradoxical status of sex is the
opposite of, say, the status of unicorns” (Zupančič, p. 22). We know that unicorns are not real but
can very accurately describe the idea of one, while we know that sex is real but lack the ability to
formally define the idea of sex. The same is true of financialization: we know it is real but lack
the ability to formally define the idea of it. This lack of a formal definition makes for an
economic arrangement that is infinitely variable instead of beholden to a singular limit. It is the
conceptual slipperiness of financialization that grants capital its adaptability to the multitude of
class structures.
There is something of value for anti-capitalists in the capitalist non-All. The twentieth
century communist projects were marked by a fantastical vision of the communist-All. In this
vision, the communists would anticipate dialectical progression and bring about the final
resolution of the antagonism between classes through violence. The politics of the all are a
social-ideological fantasy and “the stake of social-ideological fantasy is to construct a vision of
society which does exist, a society which is not split by an antagonistic division, a society in
which the relation between its parts is organic, complementary” (Žižek 1989, p. 142). Twentieth
century communist attempts to realize the Worker as a real subject failed to fix a single set of
class relations in place as the normal or post-political relations. There was no harmony between
the classes in the twentieth century communist projects. Ultimately, the political violence and
repression meant to maintain the project of the communist-All were incapable of doing so.
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Financialization, however, suggests that perhaps there is a method for communists to incorporate
antagonism itself into their politics and to create an asymmetrical and antagonistic communism
that does away with exploitation but that recognizes that fixing any single subject as the
definitional case for the Worker or as the recipient of the social surplus is impossible.
However, the ontology of money is more complicated than the chartalist perspective put
forward in MMT supposes. The name “modern” monetary theory is a tongue-in-cheek joke
because MMT accepts that “Money has existed for at least 4,000 years” in a form recognizable
to modern people (Mitchell et al., p. 39). MMT draws no distinction between money from 4,000
years ago and money today. The MMT account of money begins in “The history of Egypt and
Babylonia” and in the practice of “wergild” among Germanic tribes (Lapavitsas and Aguila, p.
7). In this anthropological account, money gains its value from the potential for violent reprisal
for debts unpaid. Force, not precious metal, backs up the value of money. The state, with its
capacity for violence, carries on this tradition. However, as the following chapter shows, this
view of the state allows MMT to let the capitalist class off the hook for its antagonistic
relationship to the working class. In the MMT account, antagonism is optional because
“capitalist systems can have 'big governments' that actively manage the economy to the benefit
of the majority of the population, or they can have neoliberal governments that cater to the rich
and powerful” (Mitchell et al., p. 40). This reduces antagonism to the level of “bad policy.” Here,
violence becomes a neutral policy tool to enforce good governance for all instead of a method of
winning antagonistic struggles and suppressing one’s enemies. However, in the Lacanian
Marxist perspective,
“class antagonism” is not simply conflict between different classes but the very principle
of the constitution of class society, antagonism as such never simply exists between
conflicting parties; it is the very structuring principle of this conflict, and of the elements
involved in it (Zupančič, p. 41).
8

The difference between the rational-technical politics of MMT and the Marxist critique of
political economy reveals the ways in which MMT cannot conceive of financialization as the
discursive field in which new antagonisms are formed. The manipulation of monetary policy by
the state as a rational-technical strategy cannot eliminate or subsume antagonisms. Money is
itself an object that can be manipulated by financialization and transformed into a tool of
antagonistic struggle against the working class. Žižek writes that money “possess[es] an opaque
empirical being and not full actuality” because its value is not derived from its being a piece of
paper but from its representation of the paradoxical social non-relation of labor, that is, from its
failure to fully capture the notion of value within its being as a piece of paper (Žižek, p. xix).
This introduces the antagonistic relationship between classes back into the analysis of money,
whereas MMT supposes that money derives its value from the obligation to the state. The
Marxist account meanwhile holds that “Money is a commodity that emerges spontaneously and
proceeds to act as the organiser of the total social labour, when production is dominated by
private, autonomous, and independent units” (Lapavitsas and Aguila, p. 8). That is, money
emerges not from the state but precisely under the conditions of the domination of production by
the private sector. Financialization, through derivatives, renders even the different forms of class
struggle in monetary terms, incorporating those struggles into the process of accumulation (a
topic for Chapter III). Money cannot play the role that MMT ascribes to it—the role of serving
“the majority of the population” — so long as money is a tool of private capitalists and so long
as financialization incorporates the price of class antagonism into financial assets. Money can
organize the economy, but I aim to show how under capitalism, this will never be as democratic
as MMT adherents believe it to be because the rational-technical politics of MMT are blind to
the political antagonisms shaped by financialization.
9

Yet, inasmuch as MMT, reframes the economy in social terms rather than as some inert
natural entity, it can be further developed and repurposed for the movement for a communist
non-All. Charting the failures and potential areas for further development within MMT provides
a vision for a democratic and antagonistic politics that can challenge capitalist hegemony without
resorting to the fixed notions of class that prevailed in twentieth century communism.
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CHAPTER II: POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL IN MODERN MONETARY THEORY
MMT is undergoing a turbulent adolescence, longing for an identity of its own, for
meaning, for purpose. One post-Keynesian critic of MMT calls attention to this still-forming
identity by writing, “There is nothing new in MMT’s construction of monetary macroeconomics
that warrants the distinct nomenclature of MMT” (Palley 2013, p. 2). It is not just postKeynesian macroeconomics that MMT struggles to distinguish itself from, as Ur-orthodox
economists like Larry Summers or Greg Mankiw agree with many of the central points of MMT,
such as the need for countercyclical fiscal policy. Yet, importantly, though its principles are still
up for debate, its political importance precedes it, this theory has drawn an incredible amount
attention—favorable and less-than-favorable—from economists, social scientists, politicians, and
activists. Whether it is different from post-Keynesianism, whether it is economically sound, or
whether it is internally coherent, it is already changing the political landscape. By the time the
first MMT textbook, Mitchell et al.’s Macroeconomics, was published in February 2019, it had
already been three years since leading MMT theorist Stephanie Kelton served as a senior
economic advisor to Bernie Sanders’s 2016 presidential campaign (a role she would resume in
Sanders’s 2020 campaign). Now it is commonplace for figures on the Left fringes of American
electoral politics to invoke MMT by name. The Debt Collective, an offshoot of 2011’s Occupy
Wall Street protests, later adopted concepts from MMT in their propaganda and in the
formulation of their issue-based campaigns, such as their student debt strike. The politics of
MMT are already outpacing the theoretical development of the field. Rather than charting the
fault lines of ongoing debates in MMT, this chapter is meant to understand how MMT has
engaged with contemporary politics around issues of collective action, money, and finance.
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How can a movement form around a theory that is still so adolescent? The peculiar
advance of MMT can be explained best by its new rhetoric that emphasizes the role of politics in
the formation of the economy. The rhetoric of MMT has contributed new metaphors that
emphasize intentional, deliberate, and collective action in the economy, displacing orthodox
metaphors that liken the economy to forces beyond control. A metaphor has staying power in the
mind and can be difficult to overcome. In MMT, theorists draw on studies from psychology to
understand the enduring role of metaphor in abstract concepts, citing “the embodiment
hypothesis” wherein human bodily “actions lead to the development of sensorimotor concepts
that are extended into abstract theoretical domains through primary metaphors, which are
embodied through our experience of being in the world” (Connors and Mitchell, p. 6). These
metaphors communicate economic activity in terms of human sensory and motor experience, as
though you could climb a staircase alongside interest rates or feel the heat radiating off the
inflation rate. Until recently, heterodox thinkers struggled to describe concepts without returning
to prevailing metaphors of the orthodox neoclassical economics. MMT advocates recognize that
orthodox economists have mastered the “models that constrain our thinking [that] operate at a
largely unconscious level” and have thus successfully determined “the way economics debates
are framed in the public discourse” (Mitchell et al., p. 120). They question pervasive metaphors
like “[the] household budget analogy”, which asserts household budgets and government budgets
are comparable, emphasizing instead “the special characteristics of the government’s currency
monopoly” (Connors and Mitchell, p. 9). This reframing figures the economy as a field of human
action rather than an apolitical or pre-political nature. Instead of explaining the economy as
something that must be allowed to grow according to natural laws, MMT rhetorically constructs
the economy as the built product of deliberate social action.
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It is at this point that MMT’s adolescent identity crisis becomes a concern. While it is
undoubtedly beneficial to move away from the macroeconomic orthodoxy’s tendency to theorize
the economy as something natural and thus prior to human social activity, MMT’s own political
metaphor, based in tropes of popular identity and democratic consensus, ignores the role of
antagonism in capitalist political economy. The result is a theory of politics that lacks a theory of
the political. Mouffe makes the distinction between the two in this way:
Some theorists such as Hannah Arendt envisage the political as a space of freedom and
public deliberation, while others see it as a space of power, conflict and antagonism. My
understanding of ‘the political clearly belongs to the second perspective. More precisely
this is how I distinguish between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’: by ‘the political’ I mean
the dimension of antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, while by
‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions through which an order is created,
organizing human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the political
(Mouffe 2005, p. 9).
A charitable reading could place the MMT conception of the political in the vein Mouffe here
associates with Arendt, though statements asserting that “The government is not a moral arbiter
but a functional entity serving our needs” suggest a more technical role for the state than might
be found in Arendt (Mitchell et al., p. 122). The metaphors of MMT rely on an already-existing
notion of politics, that is, on a contingent form of politics. This contingent form of politics,
elevated to the universal in MMT, obscures the importance of the political in the formation of
any contingent form of politics. For Mouffe, “every society is the product of a series of practices
attempting to establish order in a context of contingency” (Mouffe 2005, p. 17). For MMT, with
its basis in politics, rather than the political, this means that this contingency obscured as politics
is elevated to the level of the universal. The metaphors of MMT suggest that politics as it is
experienced today encapsulates the whole realm of the political. The sensorimotor experience of
politics obscures the potentiality of the political. Mouffe writes that this is true of the social
generally, that “The social is the realm of sedimented practices, that is, practices that conceal the
13

originary acts of their contingent political institution and which are taken for granted, as if they
were self-grounded” (Mouffe 2005, p. 17). Because MMT puts politics before the political, it
fails to conceive of the political as antagonistic and politics as contingent. In this conception of
the political, small scale collective accomplishments are compared with the power of the state.
However, Marxists and post-Marxists like Mouffe would challenge this rational perspective on
the state because of the antagonisms it conceals. For them, the state is not a teambuilding
exercise, nor a unit formed with a singular goal. The small-scale experience of collective
accomplishment ignores the antagonistic foundation of the political in favor of a cooperative
experience of politics. While antagonism may not be the result of a natural law, it is still a
necessary component of capitalist political economy, as I intend to show. In their rhetorical
construction of politics, MMT theorists conveniently ignore the role that contestation and
violence play in the political composition of the economic.
My aim in this chapter is not to bury MMT, but rather to revise its central political
metaphor to make explicit the role that antagonisms play in capitalist political economy. Once
this is accomplished, it will become clear that the rhetorical politics of MMT currently serves
primarily to build a better form of financialization within capitalism rather than challenging
capitalism itself. By showing how MMT bolsters financialization that incorporates antagonism
into the project of accumulation itself, I hope to demonstrate the contingency of the MMT
concept of politics and the antagonisms this concept relies upon at the level of the political.
MMT has made a major step in the right direction by recognizing the political construction of the
economy, flawed as its conception of the political may be. Its rhetorical displacement of the
nature metaphors of orthodox economics is to be commended. However, its central metaphor
provides a rosy view of the political that should be challenged. As Mouffe argues
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“acknowledging the ineradicability of the conflictual dimension of social life, far from
undermining the democratic project, is the necessary condition for grasping the challenge to
which democratic politics is confronted” (Mouffe 2005, p. 4). To democratically confront the
construction of political economy requires introducing an antagonistic conception of the political
and so we must challenge the central metaphor of MMT. The economy is the product of political
activity, but political activity is necessarily antagonistic. Therefore, the economy is itself shaped
by antagonism. If MMT reconfigures its central metaphor around the political and the
constitutive antagonisms underlying any politics, then this metaphor can be used to challenge
both financialization and capitalism writ large. I hope to show how this theoretical adjustment to
the central metaphor of MMT returns the political to politics. This reversal of the MMT
formulation of the relationship between politics and the political puts the political first. From
this, other domains, such as the economy, are contested politically but agonistically instead of
antagonistically. I hope to show how the demand for an agonistically contested economy can
give rise to a movement for a communist non-All. An agonistic movement would incorporate
antagonisms, though not for the accumulation of profits, but for the democratic distribution of
surplus. A counter-hegemonic bloc of workers, women, racialized people, indigenous people,
environmentalists, the disabled, queer and trans people, and colonized people could incorporate
the agonistic politics into the distribution of surplus democratically just as MMT advocates
theorize how financialization can incorporate economic antagonisms for the benefit of some
sovereign “we” or “people” that remains vaguely defined.
To make this argument, I will first delve into the rhetorical reframing of the relationship
between the state, the people, and money to draw a theory of politics out of MMT. Then, I take
up the MMT notion of “pyramiding currency,” which describes the diffusion of money from the
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government through financial institutions and finally into the hands of households and develop a
companion theory of “pyramiding sovereignty” to describe the similar dynamics by which the
MMT state distributes political power. Third, I address the relationship between financialization
and the MMT state, especially focusing on the MMT analysis of the Great Financial Crisis to
show how its critical position toward financial institutions is limited to a rational-technical need
for reform. Fourth, I theorize how MMT can furnish the theoretical tools needed to break free of
the narrow limits of the MMT state in a more authentically anti-capitalist project of democratic
distribution of surpluses.
The MMT State
As an economic theory MMT begins with the belief that “fiat currency is valued and
widely used in transactions because it is required as the means to pay taxes and other obligations
levied by the state” (Mitchell et al., p. 134). This belief, called either chartalism or neochartalism, makes the state the first actor in matters of modern economic policy, from which all
further actions stem. Neo-chartalism distinguishes MMT from orthodox macroeconomics
because the latter supposes that markets provide money with its role as a unit of account, store of
value, and means of exchange even though the treasury prints the physical bills. Such a view
places the state as one actor among many in the market, an actor whose actions are constrained
by market logics in the same way that households and firms are constrained.
To distinguish the political content of MMT from previous chartalist theories of money, it
is helpful to turn to a Marxist critique of both the orthodox and chartalist perspectives and then to
evaluate what precisely makes MMT different. One Marxist critic writes of an antecedent
chartalist theory, “the rationale for the institution of money is not really situated within actual
agent-agent relations (respectively exchange relations and debt relations), but unfolds from the
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undisputed agency of a single metaphysical entity (respectively the market and the state)”
(Sgambati, p. 13). To understand “actual agent-agent relations” in this view requires dismantling
monolithic visions of the state and government. However, the state in MMT poses some
challenges in this regard because, in the framing of MMT, “We create government as our agent
to do things that we cannot easily do ourselves” and “In this narrative, people create the
economy” (Connors and Mitchell, p. 4). Such a view requires the state be a monolith. By
positing that states have potentials that people do not have, the state must in some way transcend
the people who found it. In order to structure the economy, the MMT state must become a
monolith unlike the actual agent-agent relations that formed it. This theory runs into some
problems right away. For one, a monolithic theory of the state can only conceive of economic
inefficiency as the result of a single actor. Thus, politics becomes an optimization problem
undertaken by an undifferentiated actor working in the interest of the entire polity. A monolithic
theory of the state cannot account for antagonism between agents because it is the sole agent of
political action and it represents all sides of every antagonism it contains. In an optimization
problem, antagonism is merely a tricky problem to be managed away. In MMT, democracy itself
plays the role of management technology, with majorities serving primarily as a check on
corruption. Underexplored, however, is the role that coercive power plays in the foundation of
any state. Why is it, after all, that government can do so much more than we can do ourselves?
By what means does the monolithic state gain new potentials not held by the people who created
it? Coercive force sets the state apart from the people. MMT skirts over the foundational role that
violence plays in the state’s ability to shape the economy. By highlighting coercive force it
becomes clear that antagonisms can produce efficiencies as well as inefficiencies, state violence
can be productive and make the economy grow, the economy is not merely a problem of
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optimizing regulatory technologies, and that the creation of money by the state is linked to the
state’s potential to use coercive force. A key example to illustrate this point comes from the
Macroeconomics textbook, which offers a brief economic history of slavery. It states that slave
societies were “weak” and “unstable” because “slave society… is operated for the benefit of the
slave owners (that are relatively few in number), and…the (typically) larger number of slaves
recognise that their lives would improve through revolution and emancipation” (Mitchell et al, p.
41-42). The antagonisms between slave owners and slaves are resolved by the slaves recognizing
a higher form of economic efficiency and making a popular revolution to reach that form. In this
scenario, democracy is merely more technically efficient way to produce and distribute
resources. Mitchell et al. root the weakness of slave systems in the antagonistic relationship
between slave owners and slaves but fail to theorize the reason why those antagonisms would
emerge in the first place. This scenario, taken to its extremes, renders the unsettling conclusion
that perhaps slavery was desirable because it marked an increase in overall efficiency precisely
because it immiserated the slaves. If that is the case, one shudders to think what other brutal
utilitarian calculations MMT can lead to. Revealingly, Mitchell et al. write that “Even in the
most enlightened form of slave society, force is required to preserve slavery” (Mitchell et al. p
41). Of course this is true, but the point is not made for other forms of state society, like
capitalism. Even in the most enlightened form of MMT capitalism, is force required? If we are to
believe that the state is necessary for the creation of neo-chartalist money alongside the view that
the state is distinguished from the people precisely by its violence, then the answer must be yes.
Thus, when viewed together the MMT state and MMT’s neo-chartalist conception of
monetary creation appear to work in tandem. Like the orthodox theory of market logic, the MMT
state is theorized as efficiency-seeking through its structure. The moment that the people
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recognize the potential for the organization of coercive force is the inaugural moment of the
state. The view of the state as a “single metaphysical entity,” rather than an assemblage of
people, in turn leads to a peculiar theory of how money is created (Sgambati, p. 13). Sgambati
writes that—contra MMT and orthodox economics—studies of money and finance ought to pay
more attention to “the actual conflicts and negotiations occurring among proprietors - and
especially among those who make money - and how these relations contribute to the shaping of
modern forms of sovereignty and property” (Sgambati, p. 29). Where Connors and Mitchell view
sovereignty as a prerequisite for the formation of money, Sgambati views the state and market as
the results of ongoing antagonistic struggles. Sgambati characterizes the relationship between the
state and neo-chartalist money as “the ad hoc agency of the state as a violent foundation for
money” (Sgambati, p. 14). The neo-chartalist theory of money at the heart of MMT relies upon
the belief that the requirement to pay taxes establishes the demand for money, that is, that taxes
make markets. This is contrary to the orthodox view in which the market takes on a monolithic
role in the creation of money through the demand for a currency.
However, the neo-chartalist belief that taxes drive markets is further developed in MMT.
The problem is that in the neo-chartalist theory of the state as the biggest debtor, the theory
“assumes the existence of a saturation point in the government's capacity to deficit spend (hence
of a limit to its power to impose a tax) that is ultimately determined by market-driven
considerations of supply and demand”, which shows that “Ineluctably, the moment the state
starts 'making the market', the market also starts 'making the state'” (Sgambati, p.16). Not only is
the MMT state thus not inherently democratic, but it also undertheorizes the potential for market
forces to shape state objectives. Not only is MMT not inherently tied to democracy, this
tendency for markets to make the state is evidence that the MMT state is inherently anti-
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democratic, subject to the wiles of anti-democratic market forces. State violence would thus
remain within the command of the rich and directed upon the working class even after the
successful implementation of an MMT fiscal policy.
The drive for an efficient MMT state is thus disciplinary, though it retains a weak tie to
certain forms of democratic participation, the extent to which state power is determined by the
markets remains undertheorized. This undertheorization is perhaps nowhere more evident than in
the lack of a theory of inflation. Palley writes, “though full of boilerplate disclaimers about the
need to take account of inflation…MMT lacks an explicit theory of inflation, how inflation
impacts the economy, and how that impact complicates policy” (Palley 2013, p. 14). This is to
say that MMT economists understand that there is a limit—what Sgambati above refers to as a
“saturation point”—to the amount of deficit spending that can be undertaken by the state, though
it lacks a theory of what that limit might be. This limit determines the extent to which the state is
subject to the market. Beyond its negative economic impacts, inflation is thus a limit on the
power of the state. Even in non-inflationary economies, the shadow of inflation compels state
action. A theory of economic democracy should thus not content itself to say that inflation is a
far away shadow, incapable of intervening in the affairs of an economy built by deliberate human
action, as Kelton does when she decries the “deficit bogeyman” (Kelton, p. 1). By sussing out
what MMT leaves undertheorized, I hope to demonstrate not only that the MMT state fosters and
benefits from antagonisms between classes, but how it does so. Inflation is perhaps the most
readily apparent case in which this is true because the inflationary limit on the state’s action will
always operate as a constraint on state action, and if surpassed will give inordinate powers
directly to the capitalist class via financial institutions with their own ability to create different
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forms of credit and thus shape markets. The neo-chartalist theory of money is therefore always
contingent upon the role of financial institutions in monetary creation.
The following section draws on some of the key economic concepts in MMT to develop a
theory of how the state distributes power to other economic and political agents based on the
MMT concept of “pyramiding currency” and other related concepts like functional finance that
present a new means of financializing ever greater portions of the economy. Such a theory will
allow us to develop conclusions as to how the MMT state incorporates the antagonisms that
define Mouffe’s concept of ‘the political’ into the daily functioning of ‘politics’ by taking the
side of the capitalist class via the financial institutions that the MMT state would further
empower. Inflation, as an egregious case, is not the only way that the state surrenders power to
the market. Indeed, the normal functioning of the MMT state is reliant upon leveraged assets
created by financial institutions. It relies upon them precisely for the role of incorporating
antagonism into the process of accumulation.
How Economic Concepts Shape the Political in MMT
Kelton writes that “If the government tries to spend too much into an economy that’s
already running at full speed, inflation will accelerate. There are limits…MMT distinguishes the
real limits from delusional and unnecessary self-imposed constraints” (Kelton, p. 3). However,
the question of how much inflation is acceptable or how to identify the limits of deficit spending,
is left unanswered. For the moment, this undefined limit haunts MMT. The rhetoric of MMT
does dispel the delusional and unnecessary aspects of orthodox economics that say seek to
impose a financial constraint on government spending such as a balanced budget requirement,
but MMT does not define the point at which the real economy is constrained by the physical
limits of labor and capital. It is a rite of passage for MMT economists to denounce the orthodox
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metaphor that likens the government’s budget to a household and yet they lack a metaphor for
what the government’s budget really does resemble. The metaphor of collective will falls short
when inflation is precisely the result of government deficit spending. The metaphor would have
to include the point at which the collective will includes its own negation. The result of this is
that concepts like inflation are difficult to conceptualize in the sensorimotor register favored by
Connors and Mitchell. Palley further notes that inflation is characterized by “the mix of sector
conditions” in different areas of the economy, meaning that it is not merely determined by the
full mobilization of labor and capital, but the appropriate mobilization of labor and capital to
meet the needs of specific sectors of the economy (Palley 2013, p. 15). At the same time, “MMT
analysis, based on an aggregate income-expenditure model, offers a false choice of
unemployment versus full employment with price stability”, ignoring the mix of sector
conditions that determine the price of money (Palley 2013, p. 16-17). It is thus not merely an act
of collective will to boost the economy to full employment, but also an act of determining which
sectors will be given which resources. Neither does MMT account for “dollarization” as a
response to economies where fluctuating exchange rates increase demand for a currency that is a
more stable store of money than inflationary money of the kind created by an expansionary
MMT state (Palley 2013, p. 19-20). Inflationary concerns thus shape political concerns within
nations, such as the sectoral differences that shape incentives, and between nations, such as the
dollarization that compels countries to surrender their credit sovereignty to pursue a currency
that is a more stable store of value.
Still, MMT has been influential in policy discussions in the United States for several
years now. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez remarked on the theory in a 2019 interview
with Business Insider, stating, “We can pay for it with deficit spending” about a slate of policies
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including MMT favorites like a federal jobs guarantee (Relman). Her call for MMT to be “a
larger part of our conversation” falls short of an outright endorsement of the theory, but
highlights the usefulness of MMT rhetoric in popular politics by insisting that whether the theory
stands on its own or not, it is nevertheless important to introduce into policy debates (Relman). It
may be defeated in those debates, but the Left flank of American electoral politics insists that it
should at least be allowed to play the foil. The popularity of the theory is thus important to this
Left flank as a rhetorical device. Furthermore, the strategy seems to be working. Kelton’s book
The Deficit Myth, a popular account of MMT, debuted on The New York Times’s best seller list
in June 2020. Macroeconomics, written by founders of the field, the first textbook in the field
and generally regarded as the definitive text in the field by other MMT theorists includes a
chapter on “The Use of Framing and Language in Macroeconomics”, suggesting that the rhetoric
is as key to the theory as its mathematical models (Mitchell et al., p. 119). Though internecine
debates continue, Macroeconomics has played an important role in popularizing MMT
discussions as both a key collection of MMT concepts and a text aimed at undergraduate
students rather than economists. It trains students in the use of this rhetoric and in its key
concepts, underdeveloped as they can sometimes be. The rejection of orthodox economic
rhetoric is the bridge between these sometimes-underdeveloped concepts and the politics of
figures like Ocasio-Cortez and organizations like the Debt Collective. At the same time, politics
is itself the central metaphor of MMT’s rhetoric. The sensorimotor experience of collective
action is necessarily limited to the already-existing forms of sedimented and contingent
formations of politics and MMT thus maintains a limit here. I suggest that the rhetorical advance
that MMT makes upon orthodox economics can be adapted to a Marxist critique that is sensitive
to the antagonisms that constitute the political.
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What is the MMT perspective on the political as it stands? Connors and Mitchell posit a
theory of the political that is more amenable to the idea of rational consensus than Mouffe’s
when they write,
We want government to act on our behalf to move us from State A (less desirable) to
State B (closer to our purpose). It is important to note that the economy has no goals.
They are our goals and we use, manage, and control the economy to achieve our goals
(Connors and Mitchell, p. 16).
Thus conceived, the state is justified by its service to a unified “we.” Politics is the process of
pursuing the common goals of this “we” and thus requires a fuller identification with “we” than
is provided by orthodox macroeconomic metaphors that personalize, naturalize, or deify the
economy. By drawing attention to this “we,” MMT gains a utility for politicians like
Representative Ocasio Cortez who mean to build electoral movements. But who are we? This
question has the potential to reintroduce antagonisms into MMT. Mouffe warns of speaking in
terms of “we” because “the constitution of a specific ‘we’ always depends on the type of ‘they’
from which it is differentiated” (Mouffe 2005, p. 18-19). For Mouffe, whenever “they” are
excluded from politics, fundamental antagonisms are soon to resurface. Macroeconomics
responds to this view by leaving the question open. The authors write,
Further, no society comprises harmonious individuals and groups. There are always
conflicting claims and goals that must be moderated. There is no single, obvious public
purpose to which all members of a society wish to strive. Even if we can identify a set of
goals that the majority of society would like to work toward, that set will surely change
over time as hopes and dreams evolve. The public purpose is an evolving concept
(Mitchell et al., p. 9).
In this statement, a democracy becomes a means to manage antagonisms: majorities can identify
their goals, which can then be revised via an evolutionary and perpetually open process. This
process also “moderates” conflicts similar to Mouffe’s desire for a “tamed” politics, though the
call for the moderation of goals differs from Mouffe’s belief in the intractable oppositions upon
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which society is instituted. That is, she theorizes a political that can be moderated in its processes
but not in its goals. A theory of the political, like Mouffe’s, can perhaps help MMT avoid the
trap of conflating its rhetoric, its politics, and its key economic concepts. The political
determines the way in which politics is conducted. Mouffe writes that, for example, that
“Antagonistic conflicts are less likely to emerge as long as agonistic legitimate political channels
for dissenting voices exist” (Mouffe 2005, p. 21). Agonism here describes Mouffe’s model of
politics whereby the friend/enemy distinction inherent to creation of the political is staged within
democratic politics rather than in conflict. The enemy is transformed into an adversary, though
the irreconcilable differences central to the political as antagonism remain. This “taming” of
politics is central to Mouffe’s political project because it allows for democratic politics that are
neither reducible to a single rational-technical logic nor destined to result in violent conflict. The
Macroeconomics view of antagonism, calling for evolution and moderation, is not merely one
attempt among many to craft a deliberative model of the political. It is itself an attempt to tame
political antagonisms through moderation. It differs from Mouffe in that politics is not conducted
on the sediment of past decisions made in favor of a single beneficiary in a political antagonism,
but rather serves to moderate the concerns of both (or multiple) sides of every antagonism
without creating new antagonisms. This move to the middle is conceived of as somehow
constraining the fringes instead of excluding them from the hegemonic articulation of a new
politics. Rather, I argue in this section that the unique concepts used by MMT advocates to
describe the economy also function as tools for the incorporation of antagonisms into politics,
not simply their resolution by deliberation. This differs from Mouffe’s view, in which a lack of
agonistic politics results in political antagonisms shifting domains and reemerging. Indeed, it is
rather a method of making antagonisms central to the process of capitalist accumulation itself.
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The key example for understanding the role of the political in MMT is credit sovereignty,
which holds “The sovereign government alone has the power to determine which money of
account it will recognise for official accounts” (Mitchell et al., p. 136). Credit sovereignty allows
the state to spend money into existence, but also distributes an aspect of that sovereignty to
financial institutions by permitting them some limited control over the currency and households
are granted even less control over the currency through their consumption and investment
decisions. The concept of pyramiding currency is thus also a concept of pyramiding sovereignty.
Credit sovereignty is not synonymous with state sovereignty as states can adopt a foreign
currency or peg the value of their currency to another nation’s currency or the price of gold.
Credit sovereignty only belongs to those sovereign states who retain control over their own fiat
currency and their own fiscal policy, thus excluding states like Eurozone members who use a
single currency between multiple sovereign nation-states, and states that have seen fit to
“dollarize” their economy. Credit sovereignty is built through the ability to tax and to deficit
spend. In the Eurozone, the national governments that levy taxes lack the ability to spend money
into existence like a credit sovereign state can. In dollarized economies, the exchange rate or
currency is fixed to another nation-state’s currency or directly uses that currency (not necessarily
the US dollar, though this is a common case). By reversing the orthodox tax-then-spend formula
by spending money into existence, MMT conceives of sovereignty in terms of the ability to grant
access to the monetary system. While state sovereignty is more closely tied to the kinds of
powers through which the state can collect taxes, credit sovereignty is the ability to create and
bestow money. The ability to spend money is pivotal to the state’s credit sovereignty because
actors who receive money from the state form markets and exchange money. Mitchell et al.
notice that the receipt of money by financial institutions empowers those same institutions to
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develop new forms of less-liquid money, such as money in savings accounts, certificates of
deposit, and other vehicles. These other forms of money in turn are leveraged against other
businesses and households, giving these financial institutions power over those businesses and
households. Financial institutions, as creators of money, share in a power that resembles the
power of the credit sovereign state. Mitchell et al. write,
We can think of a pyramid of liabilities, with different layers corresponding to the degree
of separation from the central bank. Perhaps the bottom layer consists of the IOUs of
households that are held by other households, by firms engaged in production, by banks,
and by other financial institutions. The important point is that households usually clear
accounts by using liabilities issued by those higher in the debt pyramid, typically
financial institutions (Mitchell et al., p. 144).
In this view, money gains its value because it is used to pay off tax liabilities imposed by the
state, a requirement the state imposes to shape markets. From this distribution of money,
financial institutions gain the ability to lend out their money using various vehicles of their own
invention and choice. When the state then spends money into existence by selecting financial
institutions that in turn distribute money further down the pyramid to households and firms (as
well as laterally to other financial institutions, and up the pyramid in the form of taxes) it also
distributes leverage. Since the “liabilities at each level typically leverage the liabilities at the
higher levels” ultimately resting on the sovereign currency as a unit used to pay one’s tax
liability, financial institutions become pivotal sources of monetary creation within MMT
(Mitchell et al., p. 144). The credit sovereign state is the top of the pyramid so long as “Stateissued monetary forms are at the top because the state is the only agent that does not have to
settle its obligations by delivering someone else’s promises to pay” (Lapavitsas and Aguila, p.
4). Thus, the financial institutions share in the power of the credit sovereign state. Though the
state sets the absolute limit because “Taxes reduce the non-government sector's purchasing
power and hence its ability to command real resources, leaving real resources for the government
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to command with its spending” there is within any market a system of inequality and a system by
which relatively few financial institutions define terms on which money is given to other firms
and households (Mitchell et al., p. 323). Specific capitalists are delegated the command of real
resources. Mouffe writes that “the same movement that brings human beings together in their
common desire for the same objects is also at the origin of their antagonism” (Mouffe 2000, p.
131). The state and financial institutions are both forces that bring human beings together by
making them rely upon the same system of monetary creation that distributes objects of common
desire through the apportioning of real resources and the pricing of commodities. The MMT state
creates antagonisms and through its pyramidal distribution of sovereignty manages those
antagonisms.
There are other politics that manage antagonisms. For example, neoliberalism manages
antagonisms, even distributes this management to non-state and market actors like the MMT
state would. The important point is thus not that MMT is one of many forms of politics that
seeks to manage antagonisms. This would be true of any form of politics, including Mouffe’s
adversarial politics whereby antagonism is managed through taming those antagonisms into
agonisms. Rather, what makes MMT unique is that its method of management incorporates the
antagonisms into the very process of capitalist accumulation through the capitalist non-All of
financialization, a concept whose relation to political power I explore in-depth in the next
chapter. To illustrate how MMT increases financialization of the economy, consider that “Private
debt is debt, but government debt is financial wealth for the private sector” (Nersisyan and Wray,
p. 15). Financialization has much to gain from MMT because the wealth the government initially
creates and pumps into the private sector is financial wealth. This financialization of the
economy stems from MMT’s adoption of Abba Lerner’s 1943 theory of “functional finance,”
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which holds that governments should use fiscal policy to pursue economic outcomes that press
against the constraints of the real economy rather than “sound finance” that is based in the
household budget myth much maligned by MMT, which tethers fiscal spending to tax revenues
(Mitchell et al. p. 335). This, too, is stalked by the specter of inflation. Recall Palley’s criticism
that inflation can result from improper stabilization of different sectors of the real economy.
The MMT response to this criticism is a favorite panacea, the “Jobs Guarantee” (“JG”) or
“Employer of Last Resort” (“ELR”) policy. Mitchell et al. describe the need for a policy that can
adapt to fit the needs of different sectors by writing,
What is needed instead is targeted policy that directs additional demand creation where it
is most needed. This is not as hard as it might sound. Government does not need to keep
tabs on every single sector of the economy to fine-tune its stimulus in order to help where
it is most needed (Mitchell et al., p. 341).
The JG is the most frequent policy solution offered by MMT economists for fine tuning this
stimulus to specific sectors. It is a policy that provides the option of a public sector job to all job
seekers, subverting the rest of the currency pyramid and directly paying workers. It pumps
financial wealth directly to the worker, though I endeavor to show that this has a negligible effect
on the financialization of the economy. The JG is one of the clearest ways in which MMT seeks
to maximize the productivity of the real economy through functional finance. Indeed, in theory
the JG ensures the economy is always running at full employment and in a way that is fine-tuned
to each specific sector of the economy without causing inflation. While Palley writes that “The
central policy assertion of MMT is the non-existence of financial constraints on government
spending below full employment” it is rather that MMT sees the JG as a method of maneuvering
around these constraints through an infinitely malleable program that can always achieve full
employment through specific targeting of different sectors of the economy (Palley 2013, p. 14).
Mitchell et al. claim that it is possible to subvert financial constraints through the JG, and the
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recourse that Palley and other critics of MMT take is to define several further financial
constraints inherent to labor markets. It is through the JG that the state is also able to “establish
the money-value of an hour of work” (Lapavitsas and Aguila, p. 3-4). In this sense, the
government itself is delegated the command of the real resource of labor alongside its potential
to define what labor is valuable and what labor is not.
Palley considers the government’s potential to set the money-value of an hour of work to
be a potential cause of two different types of inflation. First, “raising the nominal wage floor will
tend to spread inflation throughout the economy” and second, “to the extent that a [JG] delivers
quasi-full employment, it will also tend to exacerbate income distribution conflict inflation
which emerges at full employment” (Palley 2019, p. 24). Palley also identifies four other
downsides to the JG: cost, potential displacement of private sector workers (as an alternative to
the first inflationary scenario), perverse effects on other public sector employment and the
potential for the JG to be used as a tool to bust labor unions (Palley 2019, p. 23). Because the JG
must be perfectly adaptable to the conditions of the private labor market without potentially
displacing workers from the private sector, JG work would by necessity be low-skill, fungible
(and therefore always structured for short term), easily eliminated, low wage, and priced above
the cost of private sector equivalents. Because “anti-worker governments might try to substitute
ELR workers for public sector workers, thereby undermining public sector unions and public
sector pay” it is possible that the JG would result in a political economic scenario that is
positively hostile to worker organization, relying on workers that frequently shift from sector to
sector and that work for less than their private sector comparators (Palley 2013, p. 31). The
support of the JG in MMT is one of the many areas in which the economic theory is less
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developed than the politics. Take, for example, Mitchell et al.’s defense of the social effects they
attribute to the JG,
In addition to income, employment also yields useful production and recognition for
doing something worthwhile. While economists usually focus only on the economic
multiplier, there are also social multipliers associated with job creation. These benefits
include decreased crime and drug use; enhanced family and community cohesion;
improved economic security, education, and healthcare; protection for the disadvantaged;
environmental protection; improved local and state government budgets; more equal
distribution of consumption, income, wealth, and power; induced investment in poor
communities; and promotion of social and political stability (Mitchell et al., p. 292).
Here, the social is conceived of not as a site of political antagonism, but as a series of problems
to be solved. Rather than abolish the family as a site of economic exploitation and
cisheteronormative social reproduction, the JG would enhance family cohesion. Rather than
abolish carceral logics around crime and drug use, the JG would ennoble would be criminals and
drug addicts through minimum wage workfare. And so on and so on. MMT economists are
concerned that “if welfare (including unemployment compensation) is offered as a substitute for
a job, this has negative impacts on self-esteem” and that welfare “also wastes resources and
generates social costs” (Mitchell et al., p. 243-244). The logic of MMT is clear: an unemployed
worker who is not dominated by a boss creates costs to the social order itself. Of course, the JG
is presented as a rational solution to a common problem to be solved in politics rather than a
political problem that is the result of a class antagonism. MMT takes sides with the capitalist
social order against subject positions that challenge it.
This is not a new story, not yet. Many antagonisms are already obscured behind rationaltechnical politics. What sets MMT apart from, say, neoliberalism, is its relationship with
financialization. This chapter has examined the relationship between MMT and politics, focusing
on the ways in which MMT economists have emphasized politics to the detriment of a political
that is constituted by antagonisms. In the following chapter, I will show how MMT fulfills the
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promise of a capitalist non-All through functional finance, the JG, and other key policies that
lead to increased financialization beyond the limits set by neoliberalism. I will show how,
contrary to prior rational forms of politics that seek to manage antagonisms through targeted
repressions of counter-hegemonic groups, MMT makes antagonisms into an integral piece of the
system of accumulation itself by facilitating financialization. Functional finance, for example,
creates new avenues for financialization by drastically increasing the amount of financial wealth
in the private economy. MMT, which proposes to keep taxes low because the state can fund itself
almost entirely through deficit spending, significantly reduces the ability of governments to
check the financialization of the economy. Pyramiding sovereignty flows through the finance
sector and carries with it the need to repress counter-hegemonic groups. Financial innovation
opens social control of these antagonisms to financialized institutions that make the management
of these antagonisms into an object of speculation. As the private economy fills with new
financial wealth and the politics of MMT create incentives for antagonistic opposition to workers
and other subject positions, new asset classes and financial vehicles will begin to emerge that
turn antagonisms into the very fuel for accumulation itself. This financialized management of
antagonisms and the Marxist answer to it is the focus of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER III: MMT FROM FIANCIALIZATION TO COMMUNIST NON-ALL
Economists—whether orthodox or heterodox, Marxist or MMT—agree that
financialization describes something real, and yet “There is no generally agreed definition, or
even understanding, of financialization” (Lapavitsas 2011, p. 611). This indeterminacy makes
financialization fitting for study by Lacanian psychoanalysis, which foregrounds indeterminacy.
Lacanian Marxists like Mouffe and Zupančič connect indeterminacy to contestation and
antagonism. Writing about the place of sexuality in Lacanian psychoanalysis, Zupančič writes
“The lack of sexual relation is real in the sense that, as lack or negativity, it is built into what is
there, determining its logic and structure in an important way” (Zupančič, p. 18). I argue the
something similar is at work in financialization, namely, its lack of a definition is central to the
effects it has on the political economic discourse. Zupančič describes how non-relation, or the
impossibility of a ‘normal’ relation (e.g., there is no “normal” sexual relation), is the condition of
possibility for the contingent relations that compose the social field. She writes, “The nonrelation is not the opposite of the relationship, it is the inherent (il)logic (a fundamental
‘antagonism’) of the relationships that are possible and existing” (Zupančič, p. 24). In the case of
political economy, the non-relation between classes is thus pivotal to the project of capitalism
and financialization is the discursive logic through which this antagonism is expressed today.
Financialization is an (il)logic of capital accumulation tasked with articulating the multitude of
contingent class relations made necessary by the impossibility of normal class relations in
capitalism. This is not a definition in the sense that it does not affix a singular meaning to these
class relations nor any specific set of class structures. To put it another way, financialization is
the distorted field in which subjectivities (as opposed to identities) themselves are formed in
antagonistic relation to one another. I will argue that financialization as an (il)logic is the
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Lacanian “non-All” of capitalism today, which is an innovation upon the “capitalist-all” that
Özselçuk and Madra describe but that falls short of their vision of a “communist non-all.” For
them, the capitalist-all means that capitalism can vary infinitely, but that its supposed infinite
variation is the product of a limitation, namely, the exploitative form of appropriation, rather
than the abolition of limits suggested by the non-all. They write, “’provided that’ the
reproduction of the exploitative form of appropriation is not jeopardized, ‘the capitalist system’
will be ready to negotiate the distribution of surplus to any recipient” (Özselçuk and Madra 2005,
p. 88). In section two of this chapter, I discuss how financialization and MMT surpass even this
limit by expropriating wealth from created through non-capitalist forms of production and by
sacrificing the reproduction of exploitative appropriation in financial crises and in political
struggles that speculators feel can be isolated from broader networks of exchange and
production. Özselçuk and Madra’s analysis, while crucial to understanding a communist non-all,
too closely associates capitalism with the All and communism with the non-All, missing the
potential of capitalism to avail itself of the non-All and the specifically communist failure of
twentieth century communism, which they reduce to a different articulation of the capitalist-all
despite calling it the communist-all. To put it another way, their assumption that contemporary
financialized capital resembles political repression in twentieth century communist countries
ignores contemporary forms of financialized political power that operate not by the imposition of
limits but in the constant negation of them. Indeed, I argue that it is only by understanding the
capitalist non-all and the communist-all that the potential for a communist non-all begins to
appear on the horizon. To understand the capitalist non-all of financialization, it is helpful to
study MMT with its relationship to antagonisms from within politics but without formal regard
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for the political. That is, MMT has a theory of antagonisms as outlying the scope of the state.
This allows MMT, with its focus on the state, to cede the political to finance capital.
The argument that financialization structures capitalism as the non-all proceeds from an
understanding of financialization in its relationship with neoliberalism, capitalism, imperialism,
and MMT. In the following section, I develop a Lacanian Marxist critique of MMT to show that
MMT is amenable to neoliberalism, financialization, and imperialism and unable to theorize
beyond the capitalist mode of production. From there, I look to the way that financiers have
adopted MMT to deepen financialization by granting new political power to financial institutions
and incorporating class antagonisms into the capitalist accumulation process itself. I argue that
the rhetorical advances of MMT upon mainstream economics help explain why it is that
financialization incorporates these antagonisms into the cycle of accumulation itself as opposed
to merely imposing new forms of management. Financialization does not merely attempt to
repress class struggles against capitalism through the imposition of new modes of scientific
management or class war but assesses those inevitable struggles for the risk they pose to capital
by assigning monetary costs to class antagonisms that can be traded, securitized against, and
hedged. Even the exploitative form is challenged, but the financial mechanisms that distribute
the risk of this become the fuel for the process of financialization and further accumulation. I
show mutatis mutandis how a communist movement could incorporate antagonisms rather than
seeking to resolve all antagonisms as in the case of 20th century communist movements. In the
final section, I again turn to the rhetorical developments made by MMT and suggest that similar
rhetorical gestures, informed by psychoanalysis and Marxism, can better address the ineradicable
antagonisms inherent to the political and thereby shape a communist movement that can endure
antagonistic politics.
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MMT, Neoliberalism, Imperialism, and Financialization
To understand the role that MMT could play for financialization, it helps to consider
what financiers themselves think of the theory. In a New York Times article titled “Modern
Monetary Theory Finds an Embrace in an Unexpected Place: Wall Street,” Patricia Cohen writes
that, “Money managers, chief executives and business analysts maintain that the approach offers
several important and overlooked insights, and far from finding it fanciful or deranged, they are
using M.M.T. to build economic forecasts and even trading strategies” (Cohen). Although MMT
is often associated with the political Left because of its commitment to sweeping social spending
programs Mitchell et al.’s claim that a politics built around MMT would have a popular appeal
appears true in this case because these financiers have a fundamentally different relationship to
capital than the marginalized people who are often made the subject of MMT and yet the theory
appears to attempt to serve them both. Indeed, Cohen’s article suggests that workers and
capitalists can find a happy medium in MMT: the potential to build a Scandinavian style welfare
state without increasing taxes. Here, the political movement that has adopted MMT rhetoric
meets with the financial interests (i.e., anti-tax sentiment) that shape the theory. Warren Mosler,
one of the leading figures of MMT is “a hedge-fund mogul who resides in low-tax St. Croix
[who] helped bankroll some of the work at those schools [University of Missouri-Kansas City
and Bard College], donating money for student scholarships and conferences” for the study of
MMT (Cohen). It should not be discounted that Mosler found his way to MMT through rightwing politics rather than via the left. An article in The Nation describes how Mosler became
“something like the movement’s sugar daddy” after seeking a meeting with two major figures on
the American Right:
Mosler finagled a meeting with Donald Rumsfeld in the steam room of the Chicago
Racquet Club. Rumsfeld led him to Arthur Laffer, the right-wing economist who came up
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with the “Laffer curve” theory promoting low taxes, and Laffer, in turn, connected
Mosler with his future collaborator, the economist Mark McNary (Abrahamian).
From there, Mosler found his way to Stephanie Kelton and the seedling MMT community that he
helped to grow. To recap, meetings with Rumsfeld and Laffer led a hedge fund billionaire to
begin collaborating with and funding the economist who worked as the foremost economic
policy voice on the Sanders campaigns in 2016 and 2020.
The politics of MMT span Left and Right in the US such that financiers and socialists
articulate similar views on monetary policy today. The agnosticism toward MMT that
Representative Ocasio-Cortez showed in her interview with Business Insider is matched in
Cohen’s article by “Mohamed A. El-Erian, chief economic adviser at the financial firm Allianz,
[who] wrote in an email that ‘modern monetary theory has merit in stimulating debate’” (Cohen).
That is, financiers agree that there is some rhetorical benefit to MMT beyond the initial appeal of
its potential anti-tax content. While the rhetoric of MMT drives a political movement on the Left,
on the Right, anti-tax politics inspire the further development of the macroeconomic theory.
Thus, the underdevelopment of the theory contributes both to the development of an increasingly
appealing Left rhetorical politics that the pro-financialization arm of the capitalist Right view as
congruent with their anti-tax politics and their drive for greater economic insight for use in
financial speculation. That a meeting between a billionaire and a neoconservative former US
Defense Secretary shaped the economic policy rhetoric of the country’s most famous socialist,
even in this roundabout way, is perhaps cause to rethink MMT’s place on the American Left.
More important, though, is to consider what exactly the appeal of MMT is for financiers. The
rhetoric associated with MMT can drive policy discussions around topics such as the JG or the
Green New Deal that present financiers with new opportunities for investment, speculation, and
arbitrage. Yet, MMT still lacks a theory of inflation for example and is in many other ways still
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incomplete, so the value of these discussions cannot solely be attributed to some rational
development within the theory itself.
Like financialization itself, MMT is indeterminate. For one, its politics are not set in
stone as either a right- or left-wing theory of macroeconomics. However, MMT and
financialization are not indeterminate in the same way. MMT is concerned with politics as a
technical-rational project. It is popular because of its advances in crafting political rhetoric, and
indeterminant because that rhetoric and technical-rational project are not coterminous. Put
another way, MMT has gained prominence in political debates because of its rhetorical advances
on the mainstream but its lack of technical reasoning around issues like inflation leave this
rhetoric with a missing referent whenever it invokes a rational-technical conception of politics.
The rhetoric is a tool for debating politics, but if we accept MMT on its own terms, what is there
to debate? There are only technical questions, not fundamental disagreements. Financialization,
by contrast, is a characteristic of the field in which political antagonisms are shaped. Its
indeterminacy is the indeterminacy of markets that have no tendency to equilibrate, to preserve
specific structures of class, or specific production practices. By its abstraction from the field of
real production, financialization allows the articulation of new hegemonies and new antagonisms
without regard for real limits. That is, financialization can create new classes to exploit at a
whim. Take for instance the gig-economy worker who drives for a rideshare company like Uber
and Lyft or delivery services like Grubhub and DoorDash—a new figure in our political
discourses, an exploited subject who owns the means of production (i.e., their car) that they rent
to firms largely funded by venture capitalists that are committed to losing money in the short
term so that they can monopolize in the long run. In this case, financialization creates a new
relation of production, a new class of worker, and an aim for the capitalist that subverts the usual
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assumption that capitalists are profit-seeking as corporations pursue endless growth over profits.
The worker’s ownership of the means of production in this case are complicated by the
unprofitable aspect of gig work. That is, because the work is unprofitable, the workers who own
the means of production are still reliant on streams of finance capital that flow through VCs into
the gig economy firms. The gig economy articulates a new hegemony between venture capitalists
and what Bhattacharya and Seda-Irizarry call “knowledge/intellectual/intangible capital,”
breaking from prior hegemonies that privileged the ownership of physical capital to instead
exploit workers who own their own cars, holding access to knowledge/intellectual/intangible
capital apart from them through intellectual property laws, deep-pockets monopoly strategy, and
other forms of exclusivity (Bhatacharrya and Seda-Irizarry, p. 340). The software infrastructure
of these rideshare companies and their branding become the means of exploiting those who own
physical capital and use it to produce transportation. This creates new antagonisms between this
hegemonic bloc and the physical capital-owning workers while maintaining other antagonisms.
For example, owners of physical capital become exploited, but the hegemony of private
transportation remains in place. A Lacanian critique of finance as a symbolic order that is always
ontologically incomplete (and therefore shifting) allows for an anti-essentialist Marxist analysis
that can address this infinite variability of capitalist class structures.
By the same token, an enclosure of the field, like the totalizing rational-technical politics
proposed by MMT economists, is never truly total. This is a point conceded in Macroeconomics,
“Indeed, the economy is just one component of the social organisation that is necessary to
establish the always evolving public purpose and to work towards its achievement” (Mitchell et
al., p. 9). The efforts to “establish” a public purpose are always eventually subverted in a twostep dance by the tendency of this purpose to “evolve,” ensuring that the politics of MMT are
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always something to “work towards” and not to be achieved outright. The field is never thus
never totalized (never achieves social objectivity) because of this back-and-forth process of
establishment and evolution. The totalization of the field, that is, the actual achievement of the
“public purpose” is impossible, but nonetheless the goal of social organization is to attempt this
impossible feat. The field on which the public purpose is defined (i.e., the political) is itself in
constant flux without ever attaining equilibrium. Financialization today sets the rules of
fluctuation within this field, defining the terms on which hegemonic articulations are made and
unmade. That is, technocratic solutions to transportation problems that foreground the necessity
of including stakeholders like venture capitalists in the solutions process create the conditions of
future transportation problems. To return to the gig economy worker, the public purpose
established in the past might be something like “everyone who wants a car should be able to
afford one” but through financialization, the public purpose evolves into something different,
like “no gig worker should be required to pay the full cost of maintaining the car they use for
ridesharing.” MMT’s requirement to moderate demands of all parties makes solutions like wellfunded public transit less likely because there is no way for financiers to monetize it. That is,
public transit will be easier won by agonistic or antagonistic insistence rather than by attempting
to moderate the demand for safe, affordable transit.
The “public purpose” of MMT is constructed relative only to the internal social
objectivity of the present contingent hegemonic articulation but not to the external structural
undecidability of financialization that results in the evolution of what that public purpose might
be. That is, the public purpose is a creature of politics that cannot anticipate shifts in the political
that fundamentally rearrange the field of politics. MMT has its foot on the gas pedal but
financialization holds the steering wheel. Complicating this, Laclau and Mouffe write that
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“structural undecidability is the very condition of hegemony. If social objectivity, through its
internal laws, determined whatever structural arrangement exists…there would be no room for
contingent hegemonic rearticulations - nor, indeed, for politics as an autonomous activity”
(Laclau and Mouffe, p. xii). They state that “the category of hegemony” developed to describe
the challenge that the historical development of Russian social democracy under the conditions
“combined and uneven development” posed to economistic notions of historical progress,
suggesting that hegemony made it possible to conceive of “historical actors” whose subjectivity
was not solely determined by their status as “class actors” (Laclau and Mouffe, p. xii). Both the
hegemonic rearticulation toward knowledge/intellectual/intangible capital and the potential
rearticulation toward communism would be foreclosed by a purely objective social field.
Following this line of thought, there is no possible objective formation of the social, only
necessarily contingent and antagonistic hegemonies. There is no singular subject of capitalist
exploitation opposing the capitalist class, only different partial manifestations of the negation of
that class. No public purpose can harmonize classes in a normal relation of binary opposition and
MMT cannot objectify the whole field of social life. Mitchell et al. allude to the problem of this
antagonism by asserting, “no society comprises harmonious individuals and groups. There are
always conflicting claims and goals that must be moderated” (Mitchell et al., p. 9). Here, a
shifting terrain is anticipated by the rational-technical politics of MMT without being fully
theorized. Why can there be no harmonious individuals and groups, after all? It is a mistake to
sweep antagonisms under the rug when fully cognizant that they will inevitably resurface.
Moderation of a capitalist class and a proletariat that is only the partial manifestations of the
negation of that class cannot be moderated as if they were binary opposites because the
proletariat’s exploitation is the condition of possibility for the bourgeois class. The fundamental

41

antagonism between classes means that moderation is a farce that must preserve exploitation and
accumulation. Antagonisms in MMT are dealt with through determinations of what “must be
moderated” to maintain exploitation and accumulation. What claims and goals does MMT seek
to moderate? The capitalists would be moderated insofar as they are taxed as part of the broader
effort to create money as an obligation to repay the state, and the workers are moderated in that
they are unable to pursue their interests as a class, remaining subject to the hegemony of
bourgeois production. Under this scheme, capitalists are free to pursue new methods of
expropriation and exploitation because they accept the legitimate power of the state to compel
actors into the obligation to pay tax (which ties money to that obligation) and the power of the
state to spend money in the name of the people (which allows money to circulate). This bargain
works in favor of capitalists because the moderation of capitalist and worker subsumes both into
liberal subjects for whom democratic participation is merely a way in which rational selfinterests are tallied and weighed against one another to more closely moderate politics away
from the fringes and toward the “public purpose.” The notion of a shared public purpose allows
liberal subjects to vote on how money should be spent into existence while the reality of
financialized capital means that financial institutions capture the value created in this process.
Antagonisms over the distribution of the surplus, however, remain. The financialization of
capitalism means that finance is the mechanism by which this surplus is distributed, which in
turn means that the rational-technical and moderating politics of MMT take place within a field
that is determined by financialized capitalism.
MMT is not entirely blind to this phenomenon. The shifting terrain of the political
undermines the established public purposes, but also allows the formulation of new public
purposes through the identification of political antagonisms to be moderated. Concepts like
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functional finance and pyramiding currency give MMT an account of financialization that links
the indeterminant politics of MMT to the indeterminant politics of financialization in a peculiar
way. Both functional finance and pyramiding currency suggest that the role of the public money
is to establish strong private powers, incentivizing financial institutions and providing social
services and stimulus for workers. Capitalists are given new flows of financial capital to
speculate with and workers are afforded the ability to pay off debts, to incur new debts, and to
further entrench themselves within the financialized consumer economy. This moderates the
effects of old antagonisms, though it generates new antagonisms, such as the “financial
expropriation” discussed below. This is the general formula of moderation in MMT: both
workers and finance are accounted for. Studies of contemporary financialization that emphasize
its historical roots within neoliberal austerity often neglect the capacity of financialization to
break free of the politics of neoliberalism or transform them from within. Such would be the case
in MMT. The so-called “deregulation” of finance is often attributed to the neoliberal project
meant to foster competition and increased profit, but “deregulation might be seen as having less
to do with increasing competition within the financial sector and more to do with facilitating
[interest bearing capital’s] access to activity from which it was previously excluded” (Fine, p.
58). That is, contemporary financialization has its origin in neoliberalism but is not limited to the
project of austerity nor even profits per se. Monopoly strategies, for example, often explicitly
eschew profits in favor of growth. MMT, like neoliberalism, lets interest bearing capital loose
into new stomping grounds created by policies like the JG and functional finance that are
opposed to neoliberal austerity and profitability. Financialization thus distorts the neoliberal
project. Rather than pursuing the project of “deregulation,” MMT instead attempts to optimize
the real economy through selective regulation largely enacted through an expansionary fiscal
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policy that creates money by spending it in ways the state deems efficient. This rational-technical
politics has a peculiar way of facilitating “the capitalist logic of integrating the surplus into the
functioning of the system” of accumulation (Žižek 2004, p. 403). Unlike neoliberalism, MMT
does not rely on austerity policies meant to allow markets to naturally correct themselves.
Indeed, MMT sees inefficiencies as the intentional result of policy and derides any
characterization of the economy as natural. However, MMT can work in tandem with neoliberal
politics, crafting innovative new forms of austerity through stimulus. For example, Palley
cautions the JG can be used to undercut other forms of public sector employment, including
unionized employment. He characterizes a 2010 “employer of last resort” (JG) policy floated by
the Conservative Party in the UK as “make-work activity…likely to be used by neoliberal
politicians to attack government in general” (Palley 2013, p. 32). MMT is not necessarily a
vehicle for the abolition of austerity as such but can follow in this neoliberal vein of rationality
and efficiency maximization as highest goods. A focus on efficiency rather than antagonism
produces results like this undermining of government or other forms where supposed stimulus
becomes the very means by which new forms of austerity are enacted. Both MMT and
neoliberalism neglect the political, thereby enabling financial capital to operate unimpeded.
Palley’s post-Keynesian critique of MMT is still limited because it suggests that there is still
some fundamental “public purpose,” and that the JG is merely not in line with it. His notion of
“government in general” still presupposes an objective social field. However, by returning to a
theory of the political, it becomes clear that finance capital is not tethered to an agonistic notion
of public purpose and is rather the (il)logic by which class antagonisms are created and played
out. Constructing the public purpose along these lines—that is, without attention to the
foundational antagonism between these classes—means that moderation will necessarily not lead
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to the agonistic politics Mouffe describes but rather to a politics that is tilted in favor of
hegemonic finance. Thus, Palley’s critique of the JG is ultimately a rational-technical solution
that does not empower democratic contestation through an agonistic transformation of politics
but presumes a static political field on which politics can be conducted when this field is in truth
determined by the conditions of financialization.
The politics of MMT are thus oriented around the distribution of the surplus under the
conditions of financialization: where should it be allocated? Or more accurately, to whom? To
answer this question, we must first ask what does it mean for surplus to be integrated into the
functioning of the system? The name surplus suggests that it ought to be somehow in excess and
thus incapable of integration. This failure to integrate surplus into the productive economy is one
of the main drivers of financialization that Magdoff and Sweezy note. They write,
Since capitalists use their profits in order to make more profits, they will invest only if at
the end of the investment process they can sell the final goods. Unable to sell all the
goods produced (or, as Marx would put it, to realize all of the surplus value), capitalists
slow down or reduce their investment. Profits are hoarded or used for speculation. When
this happens, demand is insufficient to buy back the potential output of both consumer
and producer goods, and the economy turns down (Magdoff and Sweezy, p. 52-53).

Lapavitsas and Aguila follow in the same line of thought as Magdoff and Sweezy when they
write, “The state can protect and support accumulation by boosting aggregate demand but cannot
direct accumulation without radical supply reforms that also involve international action”
(Lapavitsas and Aguila, p. 15-16). This support for accumulation and boosting of demand is a
project for MMT. The “radical supply reforms” would mean fundamentally altering the global
commodity chains involved in globalized production in ways that mere alterations to domestic
aggregate demand are incapable of addressing.
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In Connors and Mitchell’s account of MMT, economic policy should be in service of
“advancing public wellbeing and maximising the potential for all citizens with the limits of
environmental sustainability” (Connors and Mitchell, p. 4). However, the three subjects Connors
and Mitchell name “the public,” “all citizens,” and “environment” are treated as potentially
demanding consumers rather than as points for the reabsorption of surplus. The state does not
create surplus value except in the case of state-owned enterprises. Rather, the MMT state is
capable only of supporting accumulation and boosting demand through manipulation of the
money supply. Massive public spending campaigns do not challenge capitalist exploitation as
such and thus even this form of stimulus effectively is merely an alteration in the money supply
as workers are subjected to new forms of exploitation created by financialization, as in the
financial expropriation discussed below. It is not that MMT reconceptualizes the public, citizens,
and environment as rightful recipients of surplus, but rather that it instrumentalizes them in the
capitalist process, extracting their “wellbeing” for a healthier and happier workforce. Wellbeing,
potential, and sustainability all in turn are thus in service of the process of accumulation rather
than the recipients of accumulated surplus. MMT does not use the state to direct accumulation, it
uses it to fuel accumulation. Magdoff and Sweezy’s point that it is part of the logic of monopoly
capitalism to horde profits or seek speculative investments more closely describes how the
surplus is reintroduced into the productive economy: more and more financial capital is used to
speculate on smaller and smaller changes in the use of productive capital. Even though money
originates in the state, it is also tethered to production and exchange. Surplus is the excess of
exchange value over the cost of production. As Bhattacharya and Seda-Irizarry argue, the basis
of surplus is not eliminated but rather obscured by financialization. They write, “fetishization of
financial capital renders invisible living labor as the source of surplus value” (Bhattacharya and
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Seda-Irizarry, p. 330). Selecting the public, citizens, and environment as sites for the support of
accumulation would not interfere with this rendering invisible of labor. However, to suggest that
there is some straightforward “visible” form of labor as the source of surplus value is misguided
because of what Zupančič describes as a “paradoxical redoubling” whereby “what makes the
products (namely, labor power) also appears with them on the market as one of the products,
objects for sale” (Zupančič, p. 33). There is no objective class formation because all classes in
capitalism are formed because of this paradox of labor as a non-relation. The rendering invisible
of living labor is a condition of it being the source of surplus value. Thus, financialization that
renders labor invisible also perpetuates it as a source of value across the many shifting class
structures that are possible within capitalism.
This is what makes MMT so valuable to financial capital. Rhetorically, MMT is
incomplete, and it is this incompleteness that renders it operant in politics on both the Left and
Right. It rhetorically as well as practically “renders invisible” the antagonisms it purports to
moderate, assuring both finance capital and exploited workers that they share a single public
purpose while enabling a political economy of financial exploitation and expropriation, even
potentially imposing new forms of austerity and dispossession under the guise of fiscal stimulus.
Consider the case of the JG, which allocates wages for unprofitable work and thus does not
disrupt the logic of capital accumulation. Lapavitsas and Aguila note that while the state can
create money, “The limits of the state’s power are, nonetheless, shown by its inability to
determine the measure of value directly in terms of the physical units of labour, that is, in hours
of work” (Lapavitsas and Aguila, p. 10). That is, the MMT state is not able to recreate the
foundational antagonistic structure of labor as in Zupančič’s “redoubled paradox.” The state is
merely able to approximate value. Thus, the value of JG wages are determined by markets,
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especially financial markets, even though the nominal price is set by the state. Rhetorically, the
Left can use MMT to argue for the JG as a source of new income and the Right can look to this
movement and see the potential for new forms of expropriation and exploitation within the JG
wage. The JG would provide a compromise between the capitalist class and the workers by
simultaneously undoing the problem of unemployment for the worker while continuing capitalist
accumulation. Such a program, however, would not moderate the structural problems that
Marxists associate with unemployment because financialization could turn even full employment
into an occasion for exploitation and deprivation. While the JG may provide employment for “all
citizens” it would not alter the market logics that create money and direct resources.
Beyond the mere potential for inflation to render the nominal JG wage as a poverty wage,
there is the potential for the JG to be financed by labor extracted by the forcing open of markets
outside of the credit sovereign nation. Marxists and post-Keynesians have criticized MMT for
describing potentials that are only available to developed economies that have credit sovereignty.
For example, “The analysis of monetary forms proposed by MMT ignores world money, in sharp
contrast to Marxist monetary theory. The global monetary system is hierarchically structured and
broad swathes of countries are subordinate” (Lapavitsas and Aguila, p. 30). World money
describes the US dollar, which develops its value not only from the US government’s decisions
on where to allocate money, but also from the productivity of private producers. MMT overemphasizes how credit sovereign governments can direct their monetary policy, however it fails
to consider that world markets create incentives for world money. This means that even apparent
victories afforded by MMT for the working class within a developed nation come at the expense
of workers in other countries because financialization acts globally and transforms national
currencies into financial assets in global markets, devaluing other currencies relative to the value
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of world money like the dollar. International financial markets can wrest credit sovereignty away
from peripheral countries and so,
MMT’s proposal about the impossibility of default of a State when it is indebted in its
own currency should take into account that the international demand for assets
denominated in peripheral countries is so volatile that in the end the governments in
peripheral countries feel strongly constrained by the permanent threat of a capital flight,
inevitably incurring in a fiscal policy that is far from autonomous (Verghanini and De
Conti, p. 27).
Antagonisms that MMT seeks to moderate domestically can be displaced and then intensified in
peripheral countries because of this fear of capital flight. Financialization acts globally, shaping
antagonisms between states, while MMT with its rhetorical emphasis on the centrality of the
state in economic decisions, fails to consider how hierarchies of money can form internationally.
Pyramiding currency is not merely a principle pertaining to the relationship between the state and
its domestic financial institutions, it also creates hierarchies of money globally. Indeed, here
“pyramiding sovereignty” is at its clearest, as MMT combined with a financialized economy
shows the potential of rich states to moderate domestic antagonisms by exporting exploitation
and expropriation to the periphery. The rhetoric of MMT can then be levelled against those
peripheral countries to declare their fiscal woes as merely the result of poor optimization of
money as a rational-technical policymaking tool.
That is all to say antagonisms are preserved precisely by the rhetorical gestures that limit
the political economy of MMT to a rational-technical project that moderates antagonisms in the
pursuit of accomplishing a public purpose. The political economy of MMT would rely upon its
incomplete theory of the economy that is nonetheless able to generate a salient rhetoric because
this rhetoric allows antagonisms to go unquestioned. As a theory, MMT does not take sides but
instead draws one side into a politics that is merely a rational-technical adaptation to the
evolving conditions of financialized capitalism. The rational-technical project of MMT aims to
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alleviate the conditions of exploitation created by capitalist employment and the threat of
unemployment through the JG. However, the type of employment the JG creates is unusual in
Marxist terms. The JG worker is not an exploited subject because JG labor is generally not
productive and thus offers little-to-no surplus to be extracted. Rather, the JG worker performs
arbitrary work to appease a “democratic” government that is swayed by private markets that, as
Sgambati says, make the state. Bourgeois fears of unemployed workers as drug addicts and
criminals fuel demand for the JG as a form of social engineering rather than a form of productive
employment. The JG is not an end to the degradation and immiseration of unemployment, but it
does manage risks to capital caused by unemployed populations like criminals and addicts (see
Chapter II Section II, above). The JG worker is not exploited but is nonetheless subject to
capitalist power. This “moderation” of the unemployed subject as a threat to capital is rewarded
with the JG wage. Those criminals and addicts who cannot maintain even JG employment are
also further immiserated. The JG is a rational-technical project of price discrimination: the
workers who are most threatening to capital are immiserated most.
Similarly, even if the JG were to successfully raise the wages of domestic workers,
financial domination by wealthy states that can finance JGs has the potential to create new forms
of exploitation and expropriation in peripheral countries to underwrite the increases in the JG
wage. Indeed, this new form of granting employment is subject to new methods by which wages
can be financialized even in developed countries. JG wages would raise aggregate demand in the
short run making it possible for the realization of surplus value in this instance, avoiding a crisis
through alteration of the money supply. MMT fiscal stimulus could thus avert the crisis of
overaccumulation if that stimulus were not recaptured by what Lapavitsas describes as “financial
expropriation.” Though, Magdoff and Sweezy do hint at “long cycles” that would render even
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these attempts moot, they make no claim to prove those long cycles, only suggesting that figures
like Keynes and Kalecki were similarly approaching such conclusions and coming ever closer to
the notion that the destruction wrought by these cycles can be avoided only by antagonistic
confrontation with the capitalist class (Magdoff and Sweezy p. 47-48). However, it is not as
though antagonisms are absent even in the short run, a key discovery of Lapavitsas. Financial
expropriation functions via the financialization of ever-increasing segments of the non-financial
economy, including housing and wages. The new (short run) forms of income theorized by MMT
are ripe for capture by new forms of consumer debt and consumer financial assets. Where
Magdoff and Sweezy describe the Great Depression and the 1970s demand shocks as cases of
financial crises, Lapavitsas focuses on the development of the financialization of workers’
incomes in the period from 2001 to 2007, culminating in the great financial crash. He writes that
“Widespread implication of workers in the mechanisms of finance is the basis of financial
expropriation”, citing increased amounts of mortgage debt, student debt, insurance, and private
retirement investment accounts (Lapavitsas 2009, p. 130). Debts and assets both draw the worker
further into dependency upon a hostile financial sector. Similarly, the financialization of nonfinancial institutions has made them less reliant upon borrowing from banks, causing financial
institutions to seek new targets for financialization. Financial expropriation functions via the
financialization of ever-increasing segments of the non-financial economy, including housing
and wages. JG wages would provide new streams of unproductive money to funnel into the
financial sector. These wages, largely untethered from commodity production and exchange (to
meet the requirements of a JG), would be inflationary, granting increasing amounts of control
over political life to financial institutions in their role as purveyors of value. Lapavitsas notes that
since the 1970s the real wages of workers have stagnated as the workers’ revenues are
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financialized into a system that “includes increased borrowing (mortgages, general consumption,
education, health and so on) but also expanding financial assets (housing, pensions, insurance,
money market funds and so on)” (Lapavitsas 2011, p. 620). While MMT proponents advocate
for debt cancellation as a stimulus to aggregate demand (see for instance Fullwiller et al. 2018)
this can be misleading as under the conditions of a financialized economy as the increases in
demand will be returned to the financial sector through other forms of borrowing and expanding
assets. Here the rhetorical politics of MMT, based in the moderation of antagonisms, merely
creates new forms of exploitation that fall outside the purview of its public purpose. Lapavitsas
ties expanding investment in financial assets to decreased labor militancy as worker-investors
learn to abhor the financial risks created by their own militancy (Lapavitsas 2011, p. 621). Thus,
even attempts to increase real income for workers through policies like a JG are largely captured
by financial institutions with the bonus of decreased investment risk created by the pacification
of labor. The financial sector’s capture of worker incomes is part of a larger problem in the
structure of capitalist accumulation itself. This problem is also crucially underwritten by imperial
forms of expropriation and exploitation. Lapavitsas writes, “Financialisation has also deepened
the complexity of imperialism. Developing countries have been forced to hold vast international
reserves that have resulted in net lending by the poor to the rich” (Lapavitsas 2009, p. 115).
Thus, workers in the developed countries become increasingly implicated in an imperialist
system of finance, further weakening the potential for solidarity between workers of developed
nations and peripheral nations. Politically, a working class in a developed country that is
captivated by MMT rhetoric will potentially weaken domestic unions and international workers’
solidarity to gain the JG wage and further entrenchment within debt and ownership of
financialized assets like housing and education.
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Further, paying for unproductive labor via a JG is not capable of addressing the crises of
“overaccumulation” that Magdoff and Sweezy suggest have an inherent tie to capitalist
speculative investment. They write, “it is true that investment by capitalists is the generator of
economic growth. But it is equally true that investment tends to produce an overaccumulation of
capital, which in turn leads to recurrent crises” (Magdoff and Sweezy, p. 51). These recurrent
crises are driven by a turn to financial speculation that occurs when capital investments begin to
produce stagnating returns. The JG, with its unproductive labor does not increase investment
because it has little to do with the production of value that can be invested or speculated on.
Instead, it is an attempt to create value purely by choosing the point at which money enters the
economy.
Financialization is a method of incorporating surplus back into the financial sector and
distributing out the risks inherent to the capitalist accumulation process. MMT does not
challenge this process so long as it pursues the “public purpose” through “moderation” that treats
the dialectical contradiction between classes as a binary opposition instead of taking an
antagonistic approach toward the capitalist class. While Foster and McChesney write that
financialization “represent[s] the failure of the capital accumulation process at the system’s
rotting center” it is also true that this failure is in some sense constitutive of today’s capitalist
accumulation process (Foster and McChesney). To put things in psychoanalytic terms, the rotting
center does not imply a previous unrotten capitalism because “the being that is lost is not to be
regarded in terms of some originally existing state of plenitude. The subject’s desire for a
wholeness of being is rather a retroactive effect of the splitting within being, and of the
concomitant formation of partial objects of the drive” (Özselçuk and Madra 2014, p. 145). Here,
Özselçuk and Madra converge with Zupančič in their discussion of a central paradox as
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foundational. The image of an unrotten center is possible only under the retroactive condition of
a rotting center. The rotting center is a necessity for the formation of capitalist political economy.
As in Zupančič, where the point is that there is no irreducible, visible, and unfetishized labor, the
point here is that the failure of capital accumulation at its rotting center is constitutive of the
system’s success. Özselçuk and Madra’s claim that the capitalist-all is the product of the limit
imposed by the success of the capitalist accumulation process is challenged here. They claim that
all class conflict in capitalism, “To the extent that it is centered on securing a ‘cut’ of the surplus
value without challenging the ‘provided that’ status of capitalist appropriation…cannot escape
being caught up within the libidinal economy of capitalist-all.” (Özselçuk and Madra 2005, p.
88). It is financialization that breaks free of the capitalist-all through the potential of financial
capitalism to create successful accumulation through the very failure of accumulation.
Financialization and MMT both are responses to money’s failure to truly be a “universal
equivalent,” and the attempt to introduce money as a creature of the state in the MMT neochartalist view of money is thereby fuel for financial speculation on the instances where one
dollar of a given commodity fails to be equal to one dollar of the next. The “public purpose” of
MMT presents this financialization as a moderate accommodation for workers and financiers
instead of a method of articulating the hegemony of the capitalist class across constantly shifting
relations of production. Financialization works via the paradoxical (il)logic of labor as both the
source of the value of commodities and as commodity itself. Rather than attempt to establish an
all-encompassing theory of class relations, financialization is the capitalist non-all because it is
necessarily open to the infinite variations of capitalist class structures without regard for a limit.
In the following section, this theme is explored in greater depth regarding MMT’s rationaltechnical politics and financialization’s attempts to transform the fundamental antagonism
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created by the paradox of labor into risk thereby incorporating antagonism as a part of the
accumulation process itself.
Financialization and the Incorporation of Antagonism
The MMT account of financialization is specifically grounded in the notion of a public
purpose that moderates between workers and finance as though the two were both otherwise
identical forms of liberal subjectivity. This leads to a theory of financialization that can only
conceive of financialization in terms of liberal interest-group politics but never in terms of the
fundamental antagonisms that define the political. In a description of the global financial crisis of
2007 (GFC), Mitchell et al. write,
Significantly, the sheer volume of financial wealth under management outstripped
socially useful investments. To keep returns high, money managers and bankers had to
turn to increasingly esoteric financial speculation in areas that not only did not serve the
public purpose, but actively subverted it (Mitchell et al., p. 543).
This account veers close to linking financialization to antagonism but stops short. The suggestion
that there is a form of speculative finance that does serve the public purpose ignores the
structural problems of overaccumulation that Magdoff and Sweezy describe. Following this line
of thought there can be no socially useful investment when “the potential savings or surplus
generated by the economy normally outweighed the opportunities for profitable investment of
that surplus, leading to a tendency to stagnation” (Foster 2010). In other words, the attempt to
establish a public purpose that disregards the centrality of antagonism in the formation the social
misses the structural tendency of financial speculators to attempt to accumulate endlessly without
regard for that public purpose. Financialization, as non-All, subverts the limits of public purpose.
It is the reason that every time the public purpose is “established” it must “evolve” before it is
ever “accomplished.” For MMT, the problem with financialization is that it antagonizes workers,
but that it thwarts the politics of compromise central to its conception of public purpose.
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Perhaps the key investment vehicle for illustrating this structural tendency is the
derivative. In the MMT account, “Nothing is more symptomatic of the speculative excess than
the special collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) created by investment banks to allow hedge
funds to bet against homeowners and the holders of securitised mortgages” (Mitchell et al., p.
543). Here again, the problem with derivative swaps is conceptualized in terms of excess—the
problem being that CDOs grant financial institutions the ability to behave as though there were
an antagonistic relationship with homeowners instead of a harmonious financial sector in which
all parties work toward a shared public purpose. Of course, there is such an antagonistic
relationship. Jodi Dean gives a Lacanian Marxist reading of the role played by derivatives in the
GFC that foregrounds the antagonism inherent in this form of speculation:
At this interface of the extremes of profit and loss, poverty (like risk) isn’t an unavoidable
byproduct of capitalism but its condition and content—the increase in the number of poor
people is an investment opportunity. The system turns in on itself and feeds on its own
excesses. The derivative is the commodity form of this reflexive circuit. (Dean 2014, p.
64).
This reading suggests that the profitability of the derivative is directly tied to the expropriation of
the poor. Dean’s contemplation of poverty and risk as condition and content of capitalism
contradicts the MMT account in which the harmonious relations of investors and workers is
undermined by excessive greed. Indeed, Mitchell et al. suggest a rather unusual policy solution
to financial crises: “Top management should have been required to submit resignations as a
condition of lending, with the US Federal Reserve or Treasury holding the letters until they could
decide which should be accepted” and crimes should be prosecuted (Mitchell et al., p. 547). This
attempt to personalize the fault for a crisis created by the structural incentives of financial capital
is a limit of a liberal politics that sees deviation from the compromise of a “public purpose” as
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something other than the result of political antagonisms that cannot be contained by rationaltechnical politics.
The inability of rational-technical politics like MMT to apprehend financialization stems
from the structure of rational-technical politics and the tension created by the complexity of
financial data. Dean dubs popular coverage of the financial sector “finance porn” because of the
ways in which this coverage makes financial processes appear incomprehensibly complex to
anyone but an ingenious class of “quants” who are “nearly magical geeks, siphoned off from
academia” (Dean 2014, p. 67). Though these markets are attributed a kind of rationality through
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) that asserts “markets must be efficient in the sense that
prices reflect all relevant information and quickly adapt to the arrival of any new information
through the device of arbitrage” these markets are experienced by most people as a kind of magic
rather than rationality (Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras, p. 92). Dean writes,
Not only are they [derivative markets] too hard for average citizens to understand, but
Alan Greenspan couldn’t even understand them. In fact, as hundreds of lobbyists for the
finance sector worked ceaselessly to teach US members of Congress, derivatives can’t be
regulated, precisely because no one understands them. Beyond comprehension, they are
beyond control. (Dean, 2014, p. 67).
Here, too, there is a process of fetishism that renders labor invisible through endless complexity.
Žižek describes the “symbolic Real” as “the signifier reduced to a senseless formula, like the
quantum physics formulae which can no longer be translated back into – or related to – the
everyday experience of our life world” (Žižek 2001, p. 82). The supposedly endless complexity
of derivative markets is an example of the symbolic Real because the endless complexity of
financial data effectively serves as a lack of meaning that inaugurates the entire symbolic order
of economic meaning. What is allowed and prohibited must be filtered through the demands of
the quant. Žižek describes the symbolic Real as the endlessly complex “meaningless
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letter/formula (as in the Real of modern science)” (Žižek 2001, p. 82). It is this meaninglessness
that allows the symbolic order to function as a site of political power: one must rely upon the
expert knowledge of the scientist, the doctor, or the quant to make sense of one’s subjectivity.
Further, the Real is tied to the non-relation, which Zupančič describes in terms of sexual nonrelation by writing “non-relation is not simply an absence of relation, but is itself a real, even the
Real” (Zupancic, p. 18). That is, the sexual non-relation, or the absence of a universal Idea of
sexuality, determines the structure of the partial drives that animate sexuality in its material
reality. The non-relation is the Real of sexuality or as Zupančič puts it, “The lack of sexual
relation is real in the sense that, as lack or negativity, it is built into what is there, determining its
logic and structure in an important way” (Zupancic, p. 18). In class terms, the capitalist class—
through their priestly quants—divines the limits of politics relative to the demands of the esoteric
logic of derivative markets. Dean further notes that “Complexity displaces accountability onto
knowledge” citing how Goldman Sachs denied having foreknowledge of the GFC as an attempt
at self-exculpation (Dean 2014, p. 69). That is, the capitalist class presents itself as merely
interpreting signs that appear without an issuer—we weren’t wrong, it’s just that the heavens
would not speak to us!
Here, the temptation to return to MMT is strong. After all, MMT denies all economic
augury and asserts the centrality of politics. It places the “accountability” that Dean describes
onto the quants and financiers themselves by suggesting resignations and prosecutions as a
solution to financial crises. However, MMT does not move away from the rational-mystical
model put forward by finance porn. Connors and Mitchell describe how the deification of the
economy functions in contrast to their own rational model. They write, “Although subscribers to
this view [orthodox macroeconomics] would have us believe this is a rational narrative, in fact it
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represents a type of ‘magical thinking’ more appropriately associated with medieval views on the
relationship between individuals and the world” (Connors and Mitchell, p. 3). They write that the
problem with orthodox macroeconomics is that it creates too much distance from the reality of
economic relations such that “framing and metaphor triumph over operational reality or
theoretical superiority” (Connors and Mitchell, p. 5). The effect of MMT rhetoric is not to
reframe a fundamental antagonism between classes, then, but merely to better interpret what the
“operational reality” of the economy is. This, however, falls into the same trap as finance porn
because it assumes there is some un-fetishized economic relation that can be more closely
understood. MMT is invested in an economic “wholeness” that can be brought about by
deliberate policy and is thus incompatible with the psychoanalytic view that the “rotting center”
of capitalist crisis is the condition of possibility of capitalism itself. Supplanting nature with
rational politics makes no difference when politics is itself determined by the flux in the field of
the political.
The class antagonism that underwrites capitalism is the result of the “paradoxical
redoubling” of labor as commodity and source of the value of commodities. This paradox makes
labor under capitalism necessarily fetishized. Merely shifting from the mystifying symbolic Real
of the quant to the public purpose politics of MMT misses the paradox at the heart of capitalist
relations. MMT sees in the market a kind of magical thinking and thus focuses on the centrality
of the state in the economy as if the state were reducible to some rational kernel. The MMT
emphasis on “active oversight and control” as a method of ensuring the pursuit of the public
purpose relies upon a purely rational subject that can make sense of the paradox of labor.
The orthodox economists are not so wrong, then, when they suggest that the economy
functions via tremendous complexity that is more easily likened to a deity or to nature. The
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quants are not too mystical, and the orthodox economists are not too magical. Rather, the
problem is that neither they nor the MMT economists have a theory that can conceive of
antagonisms founded upon a paradox. The rhetorical gestures by which MMT distinguishes
nature from politics are incomplete because they fail to recognize politics as itself a product of a
political paradox. Zupančič highlights how humanity (the people, politics) is related to nature
itself, writing, “humanity is not an exception to Nature, a deviation from it, but the point of a
specific articulation of Nature’s own inherent negativity” (Zupančič, p. 15). The point is not that
the economy is “like human social collectivity” and “not like nature” but rather that human
social life and nature as the Other of human experience are interrelated by way of nature’s
inherent negativity. The political is precisely the failure of social life to organize itself according
to an immutable law, that is, to rationality. In the psychoanalytic view of sex, “to conceive
humanity not as an exception to Nature, but as that point of Nature where its lack of ‘knowledge’
(of sexual law) acquires a singular epistemic form” contrary to the discourse that assumes that
there is some rational non-paradoxical reality that can be demystified (Zupančič, p. 15).
The same holds true for derivatives in the Marxist account of fetishism. According to
Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras, debates over the EMH tend to ruminate over the question with the
question of whether subjects can grasp the economic realities of capitalism or are “buried in an
impenetrable complex economic universe” (Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras, p. 92). They cite Marx
to subvert this debate: “Marx’s argument of fetishism breaks with this empiricist problematic. In
his train of thought, the observing subject is always already captured within and dominated by
the ‘supra-sensible’ but objective forms of appearance of the existing complex of capitalist
power relations” (Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras, p. 92). That is, the implication of the subject
within capitalist power relations is the condition of possibility for any social objectivity. To put it
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in Laclau and Mouffe’s terms, social objectivity is the product of hegemonic power.
Financialization organizes social objectivity and the politics of MMT is merely a response to the
conditions of that objectivity. Thus, any attempt to (for example) prioritize wellbeing, potential,
and sustainability that does not attempt a counter-hegemonic struggle will do so only within the
bounds prescribed by the hegemonic capitalist bloc. However, Laclau and Mouffe are also quick
to remind us that hegemony is always contingent. They write,
Faced with the rationalism of classical Marxism, which presented history and society as
intelligible totalities constituted around conceptually explicable laws, the logic of
hegemony presented itself from the outset as a complementary and contingent operation,
required for conjunctural imbalances within an evolutionary paradigm whose essential or
'morphological' validity was not for a moment placed in question (Laclau and Mouffe, p.
3).
Putting aside Laclau and Mouffe’s strict rationalist reading of Marx as a strict rationalist contrary
to Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras, they develop a theory of hegemony as always contingent
therefore making every social objectivity contingent. That is, rational observation of the social
objectivity can be the means of unmaking that objectivity because it reveals the irrational kernel
on which the objectivity is founded. For capitalism, this kernel is the paradox of labor.
However, financialization is not merely one contingent arrangement of social objectivity.
While MMT may suggest that there is a unified and rational method for understanding finance, I
maintain that financialization is not a creature of politics so much as a creature of the political.
The fact that there is “there is no general agreement on what the term [financialization] really
explains” suggests it is not some contingent part of a single objective social reality, but rather
that it is a characteristic of the political itself (Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras, p. 89). Likewise,
where Fine describes “the contradictory hegemony of the material of finance interests” he
actually names financialization’s ability to exceed the rationality of neoliberalism (Fine, p. 58).
That is, because hegemony creates social objectivities a “contradictory hegemony” names
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something that is more than hegemony, something that can incorporate the paradox of labor into
the accumulation process itself. The requirement for the state to pay massive bailouts to the
financial sector after the GFC did not affirm the austerity of neoliberalism, it exceeded it. This
excessive dimension of financialization allowed neoliberal capitalism to withstand its own
contradiction. It is because this excessive dimension appears in any hegemonic articulation of
financialized capitalism that I claim financialization is the capitalist non-all: it is the
unintelligible element that makes the hegemony of neoliberalism or MMT intelligible. Put
another way, it is the radical open-endedness that paradoxically makes today’s capitalism and the
potential future capitalism of MMT into closed totalities.
Financialized capitalism does not merely “manage” capitalism by means of repression or
the imposition of limits. Rather, its openness becomes a tool for maintaining or exceeding
hegemonies as needed. Not content to merely repress labor unrest, the capitalist class uses
financial markets to “identify, disperse, and distribute risks” where “the dimension of risk
comprises particular fetishist representations of events/outcomes of class struggle” (Sotiropoulos
and Lapatsioras, p. 93). That is, financialization is capable of conceptualizing risks to the
accumulation process within the accumulation process itself. Derivative prices securitize against
risk. The “fetishist representations” of class struggle are responses to the paradox of labor.
However, Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras do not go far enough when they claim that derivatives
can make different threats to capital fully fungible. They write, “Derivative markets shape the
dimension of abstract risk, imposing commensurability upon different concrete risks and
establishing an objective measurement for them” and that the introduction of derivatives in some
sense creates a financialization that is “complete” (Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras, p. 96). This
“complete” financialization created by imposed commensurability is not a Lacanian notion.
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Žižek’s discussion of the (incomplete) ontology of money from The Sublime Object of Ideology
is illustrative of a more Lacanian notion that I argue can be likewise applied to derivatives:
Things 'materially exist' not when they meet certain notional requirements, but when they
fail to meet them - material reality is as such a sign of imperfection. With regard to truth,
this means that, for Hegel, the truth of a proposition is inherently notional, determined by
the immanent notional content, not a matter of comparison between notion and reality - in
Lacanian terms, there is a non-All [pas-tout] of truth (Žižek, 1989, p. xx).
The notion of a “complete” financialization ignores this non-All in which the imposed price of
class struggle is never precisely equal to the struggle it signifies. That is, the pricing of
derivatives cannot prophesy how class antagonisms will arise but can only compensate for the
risk of class antagonisms arising. The completeness of financialization is that it is always
incomplete, able only to price risk and not adequately price the actual eruptions of antagonistic
struggle. The point is not that “the monetary value of derivatives is an ‘objective’ measure faced
by every market participant in daily market transactions” but that this monetary value always
describes class struggles that are beyond the capacity of objective measures to adequately
describe because they are based in the paradoxical formulation of the value of labor. Just as
money gains its ontological actuality through its failure to perfectly represent some perfectly
visible and demystified value of labor (because of the paradoxical redoubling of the value of
labor) so too do derivatives gain their ontological actuality through their failure to represent
some perfectly intelligible proletarian agent of political struggle. The capitalist process of
accumulation incorporates the non-relation of bourgeois and proletarian through the derivative,
which allows for the distribution of struggles, but not their end. To “complete” financialization,
the derivative introduces the non-All by attempting to represent the infinity of possible capitalist
class structures in terms of capitalist accumulation. Money gains its value from its relationship to
the commodity, which gains its value from labor that is itself paradoxically a commodity; the
derivative gains its value from its relationship to the struggles that result from the multitude of
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attempts to abolish the commodity form, but in financialization that value is expressed in terms
of money, which (again) depends upon the commodity form. Thus, the struggle of labor against
capital is expressed in the very terms of labor’s exploitation. The identification, dispersal, and
distribution of risks to capital become productive elements of the capital accumulation process
itself.
From MMT to the communist non-All
The capitalist non-All of financialization is not challenged by MMT because MMT does
not comprehend the antagonistic relationship between capital and labor that makes
financialization possible. The presence of finance capitalists like Warren Mosler in the
intellectual and political development of MMT is not a mistake. Rather, finance capitalists can
find in MMT new streams of value to exploit and extract. The development of MMT is the
development of one of many possible routes for finance capital to take. However, MMT at
several points approaches a Marxist critique of political economy, most notably in its insistence
that the economy is the result of human social organization, not a divine or natural social
objectivity. However, MMT does not go far enough to assert that human social organization is
resistant to rational-technical laws of behavior. That is, MMT does not affirm the political or
democracy qua democracy.
Lacanian Marxists conceive of democracy not as a rational-technical tool nor as a set of
procedures. Mouffe’s agonistic democracy is moderating, though it treats political divisions as
the irreducible foundation of social life. By letting go of the MMT view of democracy as an
instrument for liberal rational-technical politics and the pursuit of a singular public purpose,
agonistic democracy becomes possible. Žižek points out that the attempts to evade antagonism,
corruption, and irrationality in democratic governance are themselves deleterious to democracy.
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He writes, “every attempt to elude this inherent risk and to restore 'real' democracy necessarily
brings about its opposite - it ends in the abolition of democracy itself” (Zizek 1989, p. xxviii).
The language of risk is important here: financialization does not elude risks, it identifies,
disperses, and distributes them. A democratic answer to financialization similarly requires an
embrace of risk and antagonism as unavoidable. This is not a cause for despair—one, need not
find the ineradicably of antagonism to mean that social life cannot be improved. Indeed, even the
idea of “the people” need not be abandoned. In MMT, “We create government as our agent to do
things that we cannot easily do ourselves” but this “we” is an attempt to bridge an antagonism
instead of accepting the antagonism as such (Connors and Mitchell, p. 4). MMT discussions of
“people” oscillate between discussion of liberal subjects seeking economic efficiency and as
productive resources to be put to work to achieve that efficiency. In contrast, Dean points to a
desire for popular identity that has antagonism embedded within it. She writes, “The objectcause of communist desire is the people and, again, the people not as a name for the social whole
but as a name for the exploited, producing majority” (Dean 2012, p. 204). In this vision of
communist democracy, antagonism is not to be eradicated but rather is the very basis on which
democratic majorities are formed. The condition of unity in this Lacanian Marxist formulation is
division itself. Or, as Dean writes, “Communist desire can only be collective, a common relation
to a common condition of division” (Dean 2012, p. 191). Here, the Lacanian foundation of desire
upon lack allows for the condition of the paradoxical redoubling of the value of labor and the
antagonisms it creates to be the basis for the construction of a communist counter-hegemony
against capitalism.
Rather than treating the people as a wholly constituted social body, the communist nonAll is the mobilization of “the impossibility of the people”, which is premised on the tendency of
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the category of “the people” to exceed “any government, system, organization, or movement,”
(Dean 2012, p. 204-205). The divisions inherent to social life make any attempt to define or
represent the people into a failure. The communist non-All is a politics of the “the people”
precisely in that it foregrounds this impossibility, this division in the category of the people
itself. In Zupančič’s terms, “The proletariat,” like the people, “is not the sum of all workers, it is
the concept that names the symptomatic point of this system, its disavowed and exploited
negativity” (Zupancic, p. 34). What is at issue is not the working class as some positive identity
nor popular identity as identity, but the disavowed and exploited negativity that inaugurates
capitalist social life. The communist non-All in Özselçuk and Madra proceeds from the belief
that there can be no assertion of a positive identity that claims a right to the surplus. They write,
“An important condition of possibility of this social reclaiming of surplus is precisely its psychic
letting go” (Özselçuk and Madra 2005, p. 93). That is, in the communist non-All the proletariat
or the people can reclaim the surplus only by asserting their own negativity and its pivotal role
negating the capitalist’s claim to have a positive identity as the subject supposed to delegate the
distribution of the surplus. Like the capitalist non-All of financialization, the communist non-All
is defined by its lack of limits. Financialization, which maintains capitalist relations without
respect to any limit, including the limit to maintain the accumulation process itself, resembles the
communist non-All because “communist desire subjectifies its own impossibility, its constitutive
openness” (Dean 2012, p. 206). This is contrary to MMT, which conceives its own limits as
socially objective. The MMT rational-technical project operates only within the prescribed limits
provided to it by financialized capital. However, the impossibility of proletarian or popular
identity is the foundation of the communist non-All. Similarly, the communist non-All means
that communism must make peace with the possibility of “bad communisms” that are
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nonetheless still communist instead of “state capitalist” or some other non-communist form of
social organization. Safri and Erçel give the example of a collective of sex workers who pay
bribes to the police as an example of a “bad communism” that does away with exploitation in the
distribution of surplus and that foregrounds the lack of any particular subject entitled to the
distribution of that surplus “while being subject to violence or working grueling hours” (Safri
and Erçel, p. 401). The communist non-All means risking these bad communisms. However,
these risks are inherent to any form of democratic politics. The attempt to simply do away with
antagonisms leads to the destruction of democracy and, eventually, communism itself. By
foregrounding antagonism and taking sides rather than attempting to moderate these antagonisms
as if they were the conflict of binary opposites, the communist non-All provides a way to ground
politics in the political, to give democratic majorities the ability to struggle against their
oppressors. Dean writes that, “The people are always non-all, not simply because the many is
open and incomplete but because it cannot totalize itself” (Dean 2012, p. 99). There is no social
objectivity, no unified public purpose to pursue, but the divisions inherent to the people or the
proletariat as categories allow for democratic majorities to form and to do so in opposition to
oppressive classes.
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